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Politically Connected Governments
dc.contributor.authorCuny, Christine
dc.contributor.authorKim, Jungbae
dc.contributor.authorMehta, Mihir N.
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-02T14:59:48Z
dc.date.availableWITHHELD_13_MONTHS
dc.date.available2020-09-02T14:59:48Z
dc.date.issued2020-09
dc.identifier.citationCuny, Christine ; Kim, Jungbae ; Mehta, Mihir N. (2020). "Politically Connected Governments." Journal of Accounting Research 58(4): 915-952.
dc.identifier.issn0021-8456
dc.identifier.issn1475-679X
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/156454
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the consequences of powerful political connections for local governments. We find that governments located within the constituencies of, and thus connected to, powerful congressional members reduce their stewardship over public resources. Using plausibly exogenous declines in the power of congressional representation, we show that the effect is causal. To better understand why connected local governments can reduce stewardship, we study electoral characteristics. Our findings suggest that the increased resources that come with powerful congressional representation allow local‐government officials to reduce stewardship without material adverse effects on their reelection prospects. In sum, we provide evidence of a cost of political connections: they weaken local governments’ incentives to act in a socially optimal manner.
dc.publisherAnnual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association
dc.publisherWiley Periodicals, Inc.
dc.subject.otherfinancial reports
dc.subject.othercongress
dc.subject.otherpolitical connections
dc.subject.otheraudit
dc.subject.otherpolitical economy
dc.subject.otherstewardship
dc.subject.othergovernance
dc.titlePolitically Connected Governments
dc.typeArticle
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollow
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelBusiness (General)
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelBusiness
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Reviewed
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/156454/2/joar12325_am.pdfen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/156454/1/joar12325.pdfen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1475-679X.12325
dc.identifier.sourceJournal of Accounting Research
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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