Political Representation in West Germany: the Institution and Maintenance of Mass-Elite Linkages.

Abstract

The three dominant normative theories of representation--trustee, m and ate, and responsible party--are subjected to empirical testing to determine the nature of the linkages between the citizens and their leaders in West Germany. This work builds on the empirical tradition of representation established by Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes in their classic 1958 study of the American Congress. The data base employed for the investigation of representational linkages consists of a mass and an elite survey conducted in the post-election period of 1969. The initial testing of the Miller-Strokes model revealed that the unique hybrid electoral system, which combines a single-member district and proportional representation system that inadvertently guarantees a large portion of the "losing" district c and idates entry into the Bundestag, confounded the representational relationship in West Germany. The largely negative congruence between the representative's views and the district opinion was directly linked to the presence of list deputies, the "losing" c and idates, in the Bundestag. The two distinct electoral types were subsequently analyzed separately, an analysis that yielded a basic level of issue agreement between the directly-elected deputies and their constituents. The theoretical construct that received most confirmation in the German setting was the Burkean formulation. In this case, the trustee representatives were not linked back to citizen control, as was originally posited by Miller and Stokes, but rather remained autonomous of local interests and constraints. While potentially contradictory to the basic principles of democratic representation, these findings were found to square neatly with the perceptions the rulers and the ruled had about the style of representation that should manifest itself in West Germany. The Burkean model, while the dominant form of representational linkage to emerge, was not the only one to receive empirical validation, however. Although the initial bond between the deputy's attitudes and the party vote was found to be fairly strong, the linkage back to the constituency received little empirical confirmation. Yet the basis of the party model rests on the assumption that partisan supporters would be linked to the political system through the parties and not necessarily on the basis of geographical ties. Subdividing the voters into party supporter groups the party model was affirmed and voter control over the legislative actions of the partisan elites was empirically verified. In sharp contrast to the elites and the political parties, the voters were found to play a secondary role in the representational process. The m and ate theory of representation was the only formulation that received no support from the empirical test. The interests of the German citizens were found to be promoted by the efforts of the political parties and the representatives.