The Fatimid Army During the Early Crusades.

Abstract

Although the early Crusades have been studied by a number of excellent scholars, the Fatimid perspective of the events of the early twelfth century has never been fully examined, despite the obvious fact that the full implications of course of the Crusades can not be understood until Fatimid policies and activities have been adequately described. This study attempts to analyze the organization of the Fatimid army their response to the Crusader invasions. Two different aspects of this problem are discussed. First, the organization, administration, equipment and tactics of the Fatimid army are studied in Chapters Three to Five. Contrary to previous misconceptions the Fatimid army is shown to have been well organized, equipped and trained, and smaller than is usually supposed. The weaknesses of the Fatimid military system which led to their loss of Palestine were inadequate military leadership, regimental factionalism, lack of clearly defined foreign policy goals, passive military strategy and poor morale, as well as important strategic and logistical difficulties arising from being forced to fight a defensive war in Palestine from military bases in Egypt. In Chapters Six and Seven the strategic and tactical activities of the Fatimids are discussed. Their foreign policy goals are shown to have been passive, and a number of grave strategic problems facing the Fatimids fighting a war in Palestine are elucidated. Finally five battles are discussed in detail, presenting new interpretations of the course of the battles based on an underst and ing of Fatimid military organization and medieval Muslim military theory.