Patronage and Politics in the Soviet Union (Elites, Leadership Change, Mobility, Recruitment, Clientelism).

Abstract

The dissertation provides a study of elite recruitment and mobility in the Soviet Union, with particular attention to the role of patronage ties. Patronage is defined and the norms underlying this political relationship are explored. Coalition-building efforts after leadership successions are shown to involve the recruitment of clients and the building of alliances linking patronage networks. Three sets of analyses comprise an investigation of elite mobility and patronage during the Brezhnev era. Aggregate biographical data for approximately 1,000 Central Committee members are used in a systematic analysis of mobility norms of the national political elite. Patronage networks are shown to form around leading Politburo members and Party secretaries. The Party General Secretary uses recruitment of trusted clients to consolidate his power base within the Party apparatus. Party first secretaries in two Soviet republics, Azerbaidzhan and Lithuania, also are shown to rely upon personnel turnover and client recruitment to consolidate their positions. Analysis of biographical data for approximately 400 Azerbaidzhani and 225 Lithuanian Central Committee members reveals that new republic Party first secretaries possess the political strength to alter the composition of leading Party and state organs as they form governing coalitions. "Native" republic first secretaries assume the leading roles in organizational and policy matters, while Russian second secretaries assume secondary watchdog functions. Finally, the dissertation indicates that patronage connections are related to an identifiable attitudinal constraint among a network's members. This is especially true for the Party General Secretary's patronage group. His coalition-building efforts and ability to recruit clients to top positions help him as his guiding coalition develops a comprehensive policy program. The Party chief executive continues to assume a dominant position in the Soviet policy process. His control over the central Party apparatus is revealed to be critical to his leading role in the decision-making process. Patronage thrives in the Soviet-type system, where decision-making power is centralized in a unified set of hierarchies. Patronage networks help a chief executive in linking the Party and state apparatuses, as well as in linking political organs at different levels of authority. Often viewed as dysfunctional, patronage is shown to facilitate governance in the Soviet-type system.