Taking Sides and Taking Risks: Soviet Conflict Involvement Behavior, 1950-1983 (Foreign Policy, Cold War, Third World, Military, Model).

Abstract

This dissertation seeks to explain and predict Soviet involvement in other nations'conflicts during the period 1950-83. It develops two rational choice models--the Concentric Alliance model to account for Soviet choice of side to support; and the Concentric Salience model to predict the highest level of resources Moscow will commit. When tested on 340 diverse interstate and civil conflicts listed by the Correlates of War and Conflict and Peace Data Bank projects, these models correctly predicted Soviet support behavior more than 70 per cent of the time. Their predictive accuracy is significantly better than either the Mirror Image or R and om Guess models. Longitudinal analysis of their performance suggests their general applicability, albeit with minor changes, across the 34 year period surveyed. The different tests successfully hurdled by the Concentric Alliance and Concentric Salience models suggest they have identified the major components of Moscow's operational code for conflict involvement. Moscow generally supports the belligerent with closer alliance ties to itself or fewer alliance bonds with the US. The level of resources it commits depends on the complex interplay of the salience of the conflict, risks of military confrontation with the US, the alliance bonds of the protagonists and the intensity of the conflict. Its support behavior amounts to a low cost, low risk roll back strategy--while verbal support is liberally dispensed, arms or military personnel assistance are rarely extended. Contrary to popular belief, guerilla movements of whatever ideological persuasion rarely receive direct military assistance from Moscow; embattled governments are the more likely recipients of such aid. The findings also show that over the years, Moscow has become more intervention prone. The pattern of its intervention indicates transition from a regional, defensive to a globalist definition of its national interests. What further emerges from the analysis is a general portrait of Soviet foreign policy decision-making that offers correctives to the limitations of the "Master Plan", "Targets of Opportunity", "Mirror Image", "Factional" and "Containment" theories.