The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (Eca): a Study of Factors Affecting the Performance of Eca-Sponsored Institutions.

Abstract

The post World War II period has witnessed a proliferation of international governmental organizations (IGOs). The Brussels-based Union of International Associations listed 1,101 IGOs in the 1981 Yearbook of International Organizations. By far the largest category (n = 405) was that class of agencies created by extant IGOs. Generally, the offshoots represent efforts by the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) to gain more control over United Nations technical assistance programs and to accelerate their pace of economic and social transformation. Have the new agencies been effective in carrying out their m and ates? This study examined six IGOs established as semi-autonomous agencies under the aegis of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) to foster economic and social progress in Africa. The aim of the study was to underst and how the effectiveness of ECA-sponsored IGOs was influenced by three variables chosen for their theoretical and practical import: autonomy, international support, and prestige. By using a "historical improvement" approach, these IGOs were analyzed to underst and how effective they have been in carrying out their m and ates, and the impact each of the three variables (autonomy, international support, and prestige) has had on the agencies' performance. Of the six IGOs examined, four appeared to have been reasonably effective whereas the other two appeared less effective. The more effective IGOs seemed to have benefited from ample autonomy with respect to ECA; were the recipients of substantial international support; and enjoyed some initial prestige which they were able to increase through demonstrable operational accomplishments. The less effective IGOs seemed to have enjoyed too little autonomy with respect to ECA; were less able to build on their initial prestige; and could clearly use substantially more international support. The results of this study suggest that LDCs strategy of initiating offshoot-IGOs to hasten development within LDCs will produce more positive outcomes if the new IGOs are carefully selected to ensure that they operate in functional areas that can reasonably be expected to attract adequate international support; if the IGOs enjoy adequate autonomy from the parent IGOs creating them; and if they can move quickly to bolster their initial prestige through early and sustained operational accomplishments.