American Economic Aid to Egypt, 1975--86: Political and Bureaucratic Struggles Over Aid Disbursement and Development Choices.

Abstract

This study examines the extent to which American aid is a positive force in promoting economic development in Egypt. I look at how foreign aid affects what is, for Egypt as for many Third World states, perhaps the most important sector in their economies: agriculture. Through a series of interviews of American and Egyptian officials in Washington and Cairo, with a prime focus on USAID and Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture officials, I analyze the bureaucratic and political struggle going on both between those Americans and Egyptians responsible for promoting development projects as well as within these individual bureaucracies and governments. While the initial questions of this work focus on utilizing aid resources to promote economic development, the underlying theoretical and policy-relevant question is one of political development. Indeed, the principal finding of this case study of American aid to Egypt is: political development is prior to and necessary for economic development. The evidence from this study is, of course, more of a "negative" nature. That is, given the lack of institutionalization--i.e., the lack of strength, stability, and /or effectiveness--in Egyptian organizations, economic development is not promoted by Egypt's government, despite huge inflows of foreign, primarily American, aid. In respect to the overtly political goals of the American aid program, I argue that while such aid did play a significant role in promoting peace between Egypt and Israel and in bringing Egypt back into the world capitalist economy, this aid is no longer necessary to maintain these profound achievements. I further conclude that from an economic development perspective, aid has of course been helpful to Egypt, but not to the extent that it should or could have been, given the huge amounts of money invested by the U.S. in its aid program: over $12 billion between 1975 and 1986.