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CEO horizon problem and characteristics of board of directors and compensation committee
dc.contributor.authorLiu, Ruonan
dc.contributor.authorLiu, Zhenfeng
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-04T16:02:55Z
dc.date.availableWITHHELD_12_MONTHS
dc.date.available2020-11-04T16:02:55Z
dc.date.issued2020-10
dc.identifier.citationLiu, Ruonan; Liu, Zhenfeng (2020). "CEO horizon problem and characteristics of board of directors and compensation committee." Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance 31(4): 121-134.
dc.identifier.issn1044-8136
dc.identifier.issn1097-0053
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/163492
dc.description.abstractExtant research finds inconclusive evidence about the CEO horizon problem. One possible explanation is that board of directors, especially compensation committees, intervene to mitigate the CEO horizon problem. In this study, we examine whether the characteristics of board of directors and compensation committee affect their effectiveness in mitigating the CEO horizon problem. We find that retiring CEOs are more likely to reduce R&D expenditures when CEOs have more power, and director tenure is longer; retiring CEOs in firms with large board of directors and compensation committee are less likely to manage accruals.
dc.publisherJohn Wiley & Sons, Inc.
dc.subject.othercompensation committee
dc.subject.otherboard of directors
dc.subject.otherCEO horizon problem
dc.titleCEO horizon problem and characteristics of board of directors and compensation committee
dc.typeArticle
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollow
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelFinance
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelBusiness
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Reviewed
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/163492/1/jcaf22446.pdfen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/163492/2/jcaf22446_am.pdfen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1002/jcaf.22446
dc.identifier.sourceJournal of Corporate Accounting & Finance
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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