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Hospital‐physician integration and Medicare’s site‐based outpatient payments

dc.contributor.authorPost, Brady
dc.contributor.authorNorton, Edward C.
dc.contributor.authorHollenbeck, Brent
dc.contributor.authorBuchmueller, Thomas
dc.contributor.authorRyan, Andrew M.
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-04T21:51:24Z
dc.date.available2022-03-04 16:51:20en
dc.date.available2021-02-04T21:51:24Z
dc.date.issued2021-02
dc.identifier.citationPost, Brady; Norton, Edward C.; Hollenbeck, Brent; Buchmueller, Thomas; Ryan, Andrew M. (2021). "Hospital‐physician integration and Medicare’s site‐based outpatient payments." Health Services Research (1): 7-15.
dc.identifier.issn0017-9124
dc.identifier.issn1475-6773
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/166216
dc.description.abstractObjectiveTo determine the relationship between Medicare’s site‐based outpatient billing policy and hospital‐physician integration.Data sourcesNational Medicare claims data from 2010 to 2016.Study DesignFor each physician‐year, we calculated the disparity between Medicare reimbursement under hospital ownership and under physician ownership. Using logistic regression analysis, we estimated the relationship between these payment differences and hospital‐physician integration, adjusting for region, market concentration, and time fixed effects. We measured integration status using claims data and legal tax names.Data CollectionThe study included integrated and non‐integrated physicians who billed Medicare between January 1, 2010, and December 31, 2016 (n = 2 137 245 physician‐year observations).Principal FindingsMedicare reimbursement for physician services would have been $114 000 higher per physician per year if a physician were integrated compared to being non‐integrated. Primary care physicians faced a 78% increase, medical specialists 74%, and surgeons 224%. These payment differences exhibited a modest positive relationship to hospital‐physician vertical integration. An increase in this outpatient payment differential equivalent to moving from the 25th to 75th percentile was associated with a 0.20 percentage point increase in the probability of integrating with a hospital (95% CI: 0.0.10‐0.30). This effect was slightly larger among primary care physicians (0.27, 95% CI: 0.18 to 0.35) and medical specialists (0.26, 95% CI: 0.05 to 0.48), while not significantly different from zero among surgeons (−0.02; 95% CI: −0.27 to 0.22).ConclusionsThe payment differences between outpatient settings were large and grew over time. Even routine annual outpatient payment updates from Medicare may prompt some hospital‐physician vertical integration, particularly among primary care physicians and medical specialists.
dc.publisherRAND Corporation
dc.publisherWiley Periodicals, Inc.
dc.subject.otherphysician employment
dc.subject.otherMedicare Payment Advisory Commission
dc.subject.otherhospital‐physician vertical integration
dc.subject.otheroutpatient care delivery
dc.subject.otherhospital workforce
dc.subject.otherdelivery system organization
dc.titleHospital‐physician integration and Medicare’s site‐based outpatient payments
dc.typeArticle
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollow
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelPublic Health
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelHealth Sciences
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Reviewed
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/166216/1/hesr13613-sup-0001-Authormatrix.pdf
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/166216/2/hesr13613_am.pdf
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/166216/3/hesr13613.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1475-6773.13613
dc.identifier.doihttps://dx.doi.org/10.7302/139
dc.identifier.sourceHealth Services Research
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dc.working.doi10.7302/139en
dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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