Historical Violence, Trauma, and Political Identity

Abstract

My dissertation consists of three papers that investigate the influence of violence and trauma on identity and political behavior.

The first paper explores the political legacy of forced migration. Specifically, I empirically assess whether refugees reshape political behavior in receiving areas over the long-term. I argue that forced migration can foster a strong group identity among refugees, which can mobilize them toward political parties that champion their identity-based grievances. To test this argument, I examine how one of the largest forced migrations in modern history, the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe into Germany after WWII, shaped their electoral behavior over time. Using an original database of district-level data from 32 elections spanning a century, I find that communities which received greater shares of expellees remain more supportive of the expelles' political champions – the radical right – over time. This relationship is particularly manifest when identity-based grievances are unresolved and politically salient. A durable expellee identity, which I document using novel data on expellee monuments and district associations, helps account for these results. Thus, my analyses reveals an enduring behavioral legacy resulting from forced migration.

The second paper examines whether periods of systemic societal upheaval facilitate the formation of durable political generations. It tests this theoretical expectation in China, using 6 nationally representative surveys spanning 22 years. The findings reveal a distinct Maoist era generation, characterized by heightened political interest compared to pre- and post-Mao cohorts. The paper also provides suggestive evidence for three channels that contribute to the heightened political interest among members of the Maoist generation: systemic state-led persecution, mass mobilization, and a political climate saturated with indoctrination, fear, and anxiety. Past research has emphasized the lasting impact of persecution and mobilization on subsequent political attitudes. These findings empirically corroborate the notion that enduring legacies can also manifest among peers in the society spared direct exposure to such experiences.

The third paper examines why voters support parties linked to violent groups. Departing from existing literature, which analyses aggregate outcomes, I focus on the micro-foundations of support for such parties. I argue that individuals will support a party linked to an armed group if they perceive the armed group's engagement in violence and the party's post-conflict efforts as having sought to protect the interests of their community. I test this argument by drawing on evidence from nearly 100 interviews and representative public opinion data spanning the first decade after conflict in Northern Ireland. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) described its actions as a response to the oppression of the Nationalist community. Though by no means universal, the resonance of this narrative among Nationalists benefited Sinn Fein. Meanwhile, Loyalist paramilitaries portrayed their activities as protecting Unionists from PIRA violence. This community's general rejection of paramilitarism, given their support of the state security apparatus, prevented parties tied to Loyalist paramilitaries from gaining traction.

Together, these three papers provide several new insights into the long-term impact of political violence on individual attitudes and behaviors. My findings suggest that past trauma, despite differences in context and despite resulting from different forms of political violence, can have an enduring influence on the actions of individuals in both democratic and non-democratic settings.