The Political Psychology of Electoral Suppression: Institutional Manipulation, Emotion, and Mobilization

Abstract

This dissertation centers on a puzzle, arising from the growing number of examples in the U.S. and other countries where the strategic manipulation of electoral institutions aimed at increasing individual burdens and/or decreasing the probability of influencing the outcome (electoral suppression) does not seem to depress turnout as much as the classical models of participation would predict. Existing accounts either treat voters as passive actors, largely unresponsive to manipulation attempts or assume that all targeted voters respond the same way.

I develop a theory linking institutions to voting behavior. I argue that electoral manipulation can drive targeted groups to turn out at higher rates than otherwise predicted. The causal mechanism is the different emotional reactions that occur in people who are targeted by the suppression or whose group benefits from the same suppressive institutions.

Specifically, the relative position of voters in relation to suppressive institutions produces disparate emotional responses. Some people, despite participating in a thriving democracy, experience emotions like enthusiasm upon learning that electoral suppression helps their group. On the other hand, individuals aware of how electoral suppression targets their group are more prone to experiencing anger and/or fear.

This research employs mixed methods and interdisciplinary approaches to three empirical chapters. The first utilizes the case of gerrymandering in Malaysia. I show that electoral geography can be manipulated to reduce the influence of certain types of voters (ethnic minorities, urbanites, and supporters of the opposition). This chapter lays the groundwork for future empirical work.

The next empirical chapters rely on the U.S. context. The underlying theory for these chapters is the same: Voters advantaged by an electoral suppressive institution feel enthusiasm and consequently participate less. Voters who are disadvantaged by the same institution respond differently based on their emotional response to learning that their group is the target of suppression. Those who feel fear engage less than those who feel anger and mobilize. I test these predictions in four ways. First, I examine how voters respond to information about the effects of gerrymandering via two separate survey experiments. Second, I look at how voters respond to attempts to increase the costs of voting for some communities by using observational electoral data from the 2020 Georgia Senate election along with another survey experiment. My results are broadly consistent with the theory I pose.

In general, I combine insights from research on electoral institutions, political behavior, and psychology to show that electoral suppression does not always have the intended behavioral effects of demobilization. In some instances, increased suppression can become a rallying point among those it targets. Interestingly, increased mobilization among the targeted group is not always neutralized as those who win because of suppression (a.k.a. the incumbents' support base) choose to disengage. My theory applies to any political context and any tool of electoral suppression. By illuminating the heterogeneity of responses within different suppressive contexts, this research helps us understand why elite attempts to restrict some groups' access to the ballot sometimes fail spectacularly, but sometimes work. It also highlights the importance of emotions in shaping political participation within suppressive institutions. These findings have implications for both theoretical and practical considerations in the fields of comparative and American politics, urging further exploration of the interplay between institutional manipulation, emotions, and behavior across all political contexts.