Regime Survival through Omnibalancing: Insights from Sihanouk's Regime

Abstract

Omnibalancing is an alignment strategy wherein a state aligns with the international allies of its internal threat. This strategy ultimately aims to strain the relationship between the international ally and the internal threat, weakening the latter’s position. Although omnibalancing is rooted in the regime’s desire to survive threats and crises, its conditions and limitations have not been rigorously examined. Through the case study of Sihanouk’s regime from 1955 to 1970, I explain the utilization, scope conditions, and limitations of omnibalancing. Analysis of Sihanouk's successes and failures in omnibalancing reveals that external patrons are inclined to curb internal threats when the regime holds strategic importance and faces intense competition for support. However, the 1970 coup exposes omnibalancing’s limitation, indicating its failure to establish long-term mechanisms of durability. The Sihanouk case shows that the lack of infrastructural power and fragility of adapting an externally dependent strategy can ultimately undermine regime durability.