Self- Awareness Processes in Motivated Reasoning

Abstract

People have limited introspective access to many mental processes. In this dissertation, I test whether people can report self-awareness of motivational influences. Specifically, I investigate the phenomenon of motivated reasoning, where people’s decisions and evaluations of information are biased in favor or one’s attitudes, beliefs, and identities. In six empirical studies, people show limited ability to report the extent that their prior beliefs influence their reasoning. In Studies 1 – 3, I demonstrate that people update their beliefs consistent with their motivations, but do not report awareness of this influence consistently, or in a manner that aligns with a peer’s perception of them. In Studies 4-5, I show similar effects with a simulated political ballot counting task. Awareness was generally underreported relative to peers, but those who were greatly biased tended to report more perceived influence of political beliefs. Finally, in Study 6, I introduce an incentive-compatible reward task that maximizes the likelihood of honest responses. In this study, people evaluate the political ballots honestly, eliminating a possible counterexplanation about normative views of motivated evaluation. In sum, this dissertation advances our understanding of metacognitive processes related to motivated reasoning. I find that while people engage in motivated reasoning, they often underreport awareness of how their desires are influencing their decisions.