The Conflict Origin of Communication Infrastructure: Evidence from the First Chinese Civil War (1927-1936)

Abstract

How do conflict dynamics shape the allocation of state-led investment in communication infrastructure? Existing studies on communications' effect on conflicts often assume its distribution is given, overlooking the conflict contexts that shape its deployment. I argue that during post-conflict reconstruction, governments tend to construct communication infrastructure in areas that experienced intense conflict to reestablish their grassroots presence. However, even among locations with similar levels of past conflict intensity, governments may limit investments in areas previously governed by rebels because such governance signals a perceived ongoing insurgent threat and poses risks that invested facilities might be damaged or seized by rebels. This study tests the theory using an original dataset on the distribution of communist insurgencies during the First Chinese Civil War, combined with records of the Kuomintang government’s national telephone projects from 1936. Employing an instrumental variable approach, I find that counties which experienced communist insurgency were subsequently more likely to have telephone facilities installed. However, among these counties, those where the communist rebels had established regimes were relatively less likely to receive such facilities.