Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games

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Show simple item record Abrea, Dilip en_US Pearce, David en_US Stacchetti, Ennio en_US 2006-04-10T15:39:12Z 2006-04-10T15:39:12Z 1993-08 en_US
dc.identifier.citation Abrea Dilip, , Pearce David, , Stacchetti Ennio, (1993/08)."Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games." Journal of Economic Theory 60(2): 217-240. <> en_US
dc.identifier.uri en_US
dc.description.abstract The paper derives a theory of renegotiation-proofness in symmetric repeated games based on a notion of "equal bargaining power." According to consistent bargaining equilibrium a player can mount a credible objection to a continuation equilibrium in which he receives a particular expected present discounted value, if there are other self-enforcing agreements that never give any player such a low continuation value after any history. The definition does not imply strongly symmetric solutions. But under modest assumptions, consistent bargaining equilibria of infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring are strongly symmetric. Such solutions have an unusually elementary characterization. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, C72. en_US
dc.format.extent 1055299 bytes
dc.format.extent 3118 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.format.mimetype text/plain
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.publisher Elsevier en_US
dc.title Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games en_US
dc.type Article en_US
dc.rights.robots IndexNoFollow en_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel Economics en_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel Business en_US
dc.description.peerreviewed Peer Reviewed en_US
dc.contributor.affiliationum University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109 en_US
dc.contributor.affiliationother Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 en_US
dc.contributor.affiliationother Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520 en_US
dc.description.bitstreamurl en_US
dc.identifier.doi en_US
dc.identifier.source Journal of Economic Theory en_US
dc.owningcollname Interdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed
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