Guilty until Proven Innocent-Regulation with Costly and Limited Enforcement
dc.contributor.author | Swierzbinski Joseph E. , | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-04-10T17:55:05Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-04-10T17:55:05Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1994-09 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Swierzbinski Joseph E., (1994/09)."Guilty until Proven Innocent-Regulation with Costly and Limited Enforcement." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 27(2): 127-146. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/31347> | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ6-45P0K3K-B/2/dc7367d6528849f49d20937635e26a09 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/31347 | |
dc.description.abstract | We consider optimal regulations for a polluting firm when regulators cannot observe emission control costs and can only observe emissions via costly monitoring. Fines (or subsidies) for enforcing compliance are also limited. The optimal regulations resemble a deposit-refund system. The firm reports its emissions and pays an initial tax based on this report. If the firm is monitored, it receives a rebate when actual and reported emissions coincide. The enforcement constraints and the firm's rights determine whether the incentives to reduce emissions are optimally provided by varying the rebate for compliance, the monitoring probability, or the initial tax. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 1197370 bytes | |
dc.format.extent | 3118 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.format.mimetype | text/plain | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_US |
dc.title | Guilty until Proven Innocent-Regulation with Costly and Limited Enforcement | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.rights.robots | IndexNoFollow | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Urban Planning | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Social Sciences (General) | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Natural Resources and Environment | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Information and Library Science | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Education | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Ecology and Evolutionary Biology | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Social Sciences | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Science | en_US |
dc.description.peerreviewed | Peer Reviewed | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationum | Department of Economics and School of Natural Resources and the Environment, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109 | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/31347/1/0000257.pdf | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1994.1030 | en_US |
dc.identifier.source | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management | en_US |
dc.owningcollname | Interdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed |
Files in this item
Remediation of Harmful Language
The University of Michigan Library aims to describe library materials in a way that respects the people and communities who create, use, and are represented in our collections. Report harmful or offensive language in catalog records, finding aids, or elsewhere in our collections anonymously through our metadata feedback form. More information at Remediation of Harmful Language.
Accessibility
If you are unable to use this file in its current format, please select the Contact Us link and we can modify it to make it more accessible to you.