Sequential contributions to public goods
dc.contributor.author | Varian, Hal R. | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-04-10T18:22:11Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-04-10T18:22:11Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1994-02 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Varian, Hal R. (1994/02)."Sequential contributions to public goods." Journal of Public Economics 53(2): 165-186. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/31803> | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-459133D-C1/2/57923dd259304e91e39b385e47f4d2dc | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/31803 | |
dc.description.abstract | I examine games involving private contributions to a public good and show that less of the public good will be supplied if agents move sequentially than if they move simultaneously. If the agents bid for the right to move first, the agent who values the public good least will win. If each agent chooses the rate at which he will subsidize the other agent's contributions, the subsidies that support the Lindahl allocation are the unique equilibrium outcome. I also describe two related subsidy-setting games that yield Lindahl allocations in n-person games with general utility functions. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 1315974 bytes | |
dc.format.extent | 3118 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.format.mimetype | text/plain | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_US |
dc.title | Sequential contributions to public goods | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.rights.robots | IndexNoFollow | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Government Information | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Government, Politics and Law | en_US |
dc.description.peerreviewed | Peer Reviewed | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationum | Department of Economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220, USA | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/31803/1/0000749.pdf | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(94)90019-1 | en_US |
dc.identifier.source | Journal of Public Economics | en_US |
dc.owningcollname | Interdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed |
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