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Missing Market in Labor Quality: The Role of Quality Markets in Transition

dc.contributor.authorJefferson, Gary H.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-01T15:44:01Z
dc.date.available2006-08-01T15:44:01Z
dc.date.issued1999-07-01en_US
dc.identifier.otherRePEc:wdi:papers:1999-260en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/39645en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper characterizes a key feature of the classic socialist economy and state-owned enterprise, namely that of missing markets in labor quality. Under the socialist regime in which students and workers were assigned to work units, the rights of managers to monitor and reward workers were limited. The exchange of labor services was based more on measures of quantity rather than quality. Workers who performed functions broadly consistent with that of their assigned occupations for the duration of the designated workweek received the standard wage. With the reassignment of property rights, this situation has changed. Students and workers have resumed control over the accumulation of their human capital the trade of skill and effort. Managers have acquired greater authority to monitor labor - to discriminate in setting wages and bonuses and to hire and fire - as well as stronger incentives to use this authority to raise efficiency and profits. The result is an emerging market in labor quality.A 1995 cross section of enterprise data spanning 10 ownership types is used to test the hypothesis of an emerging labor quality market. The results show that certain non-state forms of ownership, in which the rights of managers to monitor and reward skill and effort are presumed to be relatively well developed, encourage labor quality, most notably training, which raises productivity. The relative inability of state enterprises to monitor and reward high quality labor is likely to create an adverse selection problem in which the most skilled and motivated workers exit from the state sector, so as to cause a "hollowing" of skilled workers and weakened enterprise performance. The theoretical contribution of this paper is to generalize Coase's analysis of the critical role of property rights in creating resource markets to the creation and exchange of quality in all goods. Analytically, the conditions for a missing market in labor quality are equivalent to those for a missing market in pollution abatement and water quality. The analysis underscores the importance of property rights in creating the conditions for the accumulation and efficient exchange of human capital.en_US
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dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries260en_US
dc.subjectTransition, Markets in Labor Quality, Adverse Selection, Chinese Enterprise Reformen_US
dc.titleMissing Market in Labor Quality: The Role of Quality Markets in Transitionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomicsen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelBusinessen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39645/3/wp260.pdfen_US
dc.owningcollnameWilliam Davidson Institute (WDI) - Working Papers


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