Official Regulations and the Shadow Economy: A Labour Market Approach

Abstract

This work revisits the role of regulations in emergence o f the shadow economy. In particular, it supplements the previous theoretical research that mainly ignored the fact that the decision to “go underground” is essentially a result of both employers and employees interacting in the labour market. We adapt a job search approach (see, e.g. Acemoglu 2001) to model a transitional economy with an informal sector. We apply and develop the idea first documented inter alia by Loayaza (1996) that there are two types of regulations that influence the size of the informal labour market through two different channels. Red tape and bureaucratic extortion (bribing) make starting a new business officially a not very attractive option and can lead new firms to the informal sector. On the other hand, taxes and redundancy pay make official firms offer lower wages which drives potential employees away into underground jobs. Depending on various combinations of policy parameters equilibria with different share of the informal economy are possible. The paper draws conclusions regarding the role of unemployment benefits in reducing the size of the informal economy. Policy implications are offered.