Show simple item record

Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights

dc.contributor.authorSonin, Konstantinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-01T16:33:08Z
dc.date.available2006-08-01T16:33:08Z
dc.date.issued2002-12-01en_US
dc.identifier.otherRePEc:wdi:papers:2003-544en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/39929en_US
dc.description.abstractIn unequal societies, the rich might benefit from shaping economic institutions into their favor. This paper analyzes the dynamics of institutional subversion focusing on one particular institution, public protection of property rights. If this institution is imperfect, agents have incentives to invest in private protection of property rights. With economies of scale in private protection, rich agents have a significant advantage: they could expropriate other agents using their private protection capacities. Ability to maintain private protection system makes the rich natural opponents of full protection of property rights provided by the state. Such an environment does not allow grass-roots demand to drive development of new market-friendly institutions (such as public protection of property rights). The economy as a whole is stuck in a ’bad’ long-run equilibrium with low growth rate, high inequality, and wide-spread rent-seeking. The Russian ‘oligarchs’ of 1990s, a handful of politically powerful agents that controlled large stakes of newly privatized property, we re the major motivation for this paper.en_US
dc.format.extent3151 bytes
dc.format.extent783904 bytes
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries544en_US
dc.subjectEconomic Institutions, Property Rights, Political Economy, Inequalityen_US
dc.subject.otherO1, P14, P26en_US
dc.titleWhy the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rightsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomicsen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelBusinessen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39929/2/wp544.pdfen_US
dc.owningcollnameWilliam Davidson Institute (WDI) - Working Papers


Files in this item

Show simple item record

Remediation of Harmful Language

The University of Michigan Library aims to describe library materials in a way that respects the people and communities who create, use, and are represented in our collections. Report harmful or offensive language in catalog records, finding aids, or elsewhere in our collections anonymously through our metadata feedback form. More information at Remediation of Harmful Language.

Accessibility

If you are unable to use this file in its current format, please select the Contact Us link and we can modify it to make it more accessible to you.