The Unanticipated Effects of Insider Trading Regulation
dc.contributor.author | Durnev, Art A. | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Nain, Amrita S. | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-08-01T15:45:23Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-08-01T15:45:23Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2004-05-01 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | RePEc:wdi:papers:2004-695 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/40081 | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | Using a sample of 2,827 firms from 21 countries we examine whether insider trading laws achieve the primary objective for which they are introduced – protecting uninformed investors from private information-based trading. We find that when control is concentrated in the hands of a large shareholder, insider trading regulation is less effective in reducing private information-based trading if investor protection is poor. We suggest that controlling shareholders who are banned from trading may resort to covert expropriation of firm resources, creating more information asymmetry and thereby encouraging private information trading by informed outsiders. Consistent with this, we find evidence that when the rights of controlling shareholders are high, insider trading restrictions are associated with greater earnings opacity. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 104584 bytes | |
dc.format.extent | 3151 bytes | |
dc.format.extent | 578136 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | text/plain | |
dc.format.mimetype | text/plain | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 695 | en_US |
dc.subject | Insider Trading Regulation, Ownership, Private Information Trading, Earnings Opacity | en_US |
dc.subject.other | G15, G14, G38 | en_US |
dc.title | The Unanticipated Effects of Insider Trading Regulation | en_US |
dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Economics | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Business | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40081/3/wp695.pdf | en_US |
dc.owningcollname | William Davidson Institute (WDI) - Working Papers |
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