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Generalized Vickrey Auctions
dc.contributor.authorMacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.
dc.contributor.authorVarian, Hal R.
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-05T21:12:26Z
dc.date.available2006-09-05T21:12:26Z
dc.date.issued1994-07
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/41250
dc.description.abstractWe describe a generalization of the Vickrey auction. Our mechanism extends the auction to implement efficient allocations for problems with more than one good, multiple units for the goods, and externalities. The primary restriction on preferences is that they must be quasilinear.en
dc.format.extent64939 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDept. of Economics Technical Reporten
dc.subjectMechanism Designen
dc.subjectVickrey-Clarke-Grovesen
dc.subjectExternalitiesen
dc.titleGeneralized Vickrey Auctionsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelInformation and Library Science
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelSocial Sciences
dc.contributor.affiliationumInformation, School ofen
dc.contributor.affiliationumEconomics, Department ofen
dc.contributor.affiliationumcampusAnn Arbor
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/41250/1/gva3.pdfen_US
dc.owningcollnameInformation, School of (SI)


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