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Equilibrium Values in a Competitive Power Exchange Market
dc.contributor.authorSupatgiat, Chonaweeen_US
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Rachel Q.en_US
dc.contributor.authorBirge, John R.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-11T14:39:28Z
dc.date.available2006-09-11T14:39:28Z
dc.date.issued2001-02en_US
dc.identifier.citationSupatgiat, Chonawee; Zhang, Rachel Q.; Birge, John R.; (2001). "Equilibrium Values in a Competitive Power Exchange Market." Computational Economics 17(1): 93-121. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/44347>en_US
dc.identifier.issn1572-9974en_US
dc.identifier.issn0927-7099en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/44347
dc.description.abstractWe consider an open electricity market with demand uncertainty.In this market, the generators each decide on a bidding price tomaximize profit. Units are dispatched in order of the bid from lowestto highest until demand is satisfied. The market clearing price isthe highest bid among the dispatched units.All dispatched units are then sold at this market clearing price.Under a market stability assumption, we derive Nashequilibrium solutions, i.e., bidders' optimal bidding strategiesand the resulting market clearing price.en_US
dc.format.extent189573 bytes
dc.format.extent3115 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherKluwer Academic Publishers; Springer Science+Business Mediaen_US
dc.subject.otherBiddingen_US
dc.subject.otherEconomics / Management Scienceen_US
dc.subject.otherEconomic Theoryen_US
dc.subject.otherOperation Research/Decision Theoryen_US
dc.subject.otherNash Equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.otherElectric Poweren_US
dc.titleEquilibrium Values in a Competitive Power Exchange Marketen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelStatistics and Numeric Dataen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomicsen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelSocial Sciencesen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelScienceen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelBusinessen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumDepartment of Industrial and Operations Engineering, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, U.S.A.en_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumDepartment of Industrial and Operations Engineering, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, U.S.A.en_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumDepartment of Industrial and Operations Engineering, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, U.S.A.en_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumcampusAnn Arboren_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/44347/1/10614_2004_Article_250744.pdfen_US
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1011274413023en_US
dc.identifier.sourceComputational Economicsen_US
dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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