The optimal choice of privatizing state-owned enterprises: A political economic model
dc.contributor.author | Chen, Yan | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-09-11T16:09:28Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-09-11T16:09:28Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1996-03 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Chen, Yan; (1996). "The optimal choice of privatizing state-owned enterprises: A political economic model." Public Choice 86 (3-4): 223-245. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/45520> | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0048-5829 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1573-7101 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/45520 | |
dc.description.abstract | We study the choices of two types of maximizing Public Servants over how far to carry privatization of industries and in what order to privatize. Two stylizations of the Public Servant's objectives are considered, a Niskanen-style Bureaucrat who maximizes a surplus budget subject to the constraint of staying in office, and a Populist who maximizes popularity/consumer welfare subject to the constraint of a balanced budget. Other things being equal, the Bureaucrat will privatize the sector (firms) with the least market power and the largest subsidy first. The Populist will adopt the same policy, if the marginal costs of products in the private sectors are not too high with respect to the marginal utilities. If the marginal costs are too high, however, the Populist will privatize the sector with the largest market power first. We also show that privatization is easier and faster in less democratic societies. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 1101458 bytes | |
dc.format.extent | 3115 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.format.mimetype | text/plain | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Kluwer Academic Publishers; Springer Science+Business Media | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Social Sciences, General | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Public Finance & Economics | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Political Science | en_US |
dc.title | The optimal choice of privatizing state-owned enterprises: A political economic model | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Economics | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Business | en_US |
dc.description.peerreviewed | Peer Reviewed | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationum | Department of Economics, The University of Michigan, 48109-1220, Ann Arbor, MI, U.S.A. | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationumcampus | Ann Arbor | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/45520/1/11127_2004_Article_BF00136520.pdf | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00136520 | en_US |
dc.identifier.source | Public Choice | en_US |
dc.owningcollname | Interdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed |
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