Veto games: Spatial committees under unanimity rule
dc.contributor.author | Chen, Yan | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Ordeshook, Peter C. | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-09-11T16:09:41Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-09-11T16:09:41Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1998-12 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Chen, Yan; Ordeshook, Peter C.; (1998). "Veto games: Spatial committees under unanimity rule." Public Choice 97(4): 617-643. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/45523> | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0048-5829 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1573-7101 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/45523 | |
dc.description.abstract | There exists a large literature on two-person bargaining games and distribution games (or divide-the-dollar games) under simple majority rule, where in equilibrium a minimal winning coalition takes full advantage over everyone else. Here we extend the study to an n-person veto game where players take turns proposing policies in an n-dimensional policy space and everybody has a veto over changes in the status quo. Briefly, we find a Nash equilibrium where the initial proposer offers a policy in the intersection of the Pareto optimal set and the Pareto superior set that gives everyone their continuation values, and punishments are never implemented. Comparing the equilibrium outcomes under two different agendas – sequential recognition and random recognition – we find that there are advantages generated by the order of proposal under the sequential recognition rule. We also provide some conditions under which the players will prefer to rotate proposals rather than allow any specific policy to prevail indefinitely. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 141726 bytes | |
dc.format.extent | 3115 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.format.mimetype | text/plain | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Kluwer Academic Publishers; Springer Science+Business Media | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Social Sciences, General | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Political Science | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Public Finance & Economics | en_US |
dc.title | Veto games: Spatial committees under unanimity rule | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Economics | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Business | en_US |
dc.description.peerreviewed | Peer Reviewed | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationum | Department of Economics, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, 48109-1220 | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationother | Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, 228-77, Pasadena, CA, 91125, U.S.A | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationumcampus | Ann Arbor | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/45523/1/11127_2004_Article_122350.pdf | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1004951809854 | en_US |
dc.identifier.source | Public Choice | en_US |
dc.owningcollname | Interdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed |
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