Focal points and bargaining
dc.contributor.author | Proulx, Chris | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Hsu, Steven | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Binmore, Ken | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Swierzbinski, Joe | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-09-11T16:31:43Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-09-11T16:31:43Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1993-12 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Binmore, Ken; Swierzbinski, Joe; Hsu, Steven; Proulx, Chris; (1993). "Focal points and bargaining." International Journal of Game Theory 22(4): 381-409. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/45837> | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1432-1270 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0020-7276 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/45837 | |
dc.description.abstract | This is a contribution to the growing experimental literature on how trial-and-error adjustment processes can establish a convention for coordination on an equilibrium in a game. A simple bargaining game introduced by Nash is used for this purpose. Subjects are conditioned in different treatments to use four different bargaining solutions. The stability of the conditioning is then studied as the bargaining game is played over an extended period. The data obtained is unusually sharp. In the long run, the median subject behaves as though optimizing often down to a fraction of a penny. The results are therefore not supportive of the view that strategic considerations in such situations can be neglected in favor of a study of fairness norms. Indeed, the equilibrium actually achieved in a session turns out to be a very good predictor of what the median subject says is “fair” in the game after play is over. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 1677460 bytes | |
dc.format.extent | 3115 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.format.mimetype | text/plain | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Physica-Verlag; Physica-Verlag GmbH ; Springer Science+Business Media | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Operation Research/Decision Theory | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Economics / Management Science | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Economic Theory | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Organization/Planning | en_US |
dc.title | Focal points and bargaining | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Mathematics | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Science | en_US |
dc.description.peerreviewed | Peer Reviewed | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationum | University of Michigan, 48109, Ann Arbor, MI, USA | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationum | University of Michigan, 48109, Ann Arbor, MI, USA | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationum | University of Michigan, 48109, Ann Arbor, MI, USA | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationum | University of Michigan, 48109, Ann Arbor, MI, USA | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationumcampus | Ann Arbor | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/45837/1/182_2005_Article_BF01240133.pdf | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01240133 | en_US |
dc.identifier.source | International Journal of Game Theory | en_US |
dc.owningcollname | Interdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed |
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