Arrow's Theorem with a fixed feasible alternative
dc.contributor.author | Weymark, John A. | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Hylland, Aanund | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Gibbard, Allan F. | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-09-11T18:34:27Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-09-11T18:34:27Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1987-06 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Gibbard, Allan; Hylland, Aanund; Weymark, John A.; (1987). "Arrow's Theorem with a fixed feasible alternative." Social Choice and Welfare 4(2): 105-115. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/47085> | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0176-1714 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1432-217X | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/47085 | |
dc.description.abstract | Arrow's Theorem, in its social choice function formulation, assumes that all nonempty finite subsets of the universal set of alternatives is potentially a feasible set. We demonstrate that the axioms in Arrow's Theorem, with weak Pareto strengthened to strong Pareto, are consistent if it is assumed that there is a prespecified alternative which is in every feasible set. We further show that if the collection of feasible sets consists of all subsets of alternatives containing a prespecified list of alternatives and if there are at least three additional alternatives not on this list, replacing nondictatorship by anonymity results in an impossibility theorem. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 730920 bytes | |
dc.format.extent | 3115 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.format.mimetype | text/plain | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Springer-Verlag | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Economic Theory | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Economics General | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Economics / Management Science | en_US |
dc.title | Arrow's Theorem with a fixed feasible alternative | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Social Work | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Economics | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Social Sciences | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Business | en_US |
dc.description.peerreviewed | Peer Reviewed | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationum | Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, 48109, Ann Arbor, MI, USA | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationother | Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, V6T 1Y2, Vancouver, B.C., Canada | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationother | Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Blindern, P.O. Box 1095, N-0317, Oslo, Norway | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationumcampus | Ann Arbor | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/47085/1/355_2004_Article_BF00450993.pdf | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00450993 | en_US |
dc.identifier.source | Social Choice and Welfare | en_US |
dc.owningcollname | Interdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed |
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