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dc.contributor.authorVarian, Hal R.
dc.contributor.authorMacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.
dc.date.accessioned2007-04-10T19:36:25Z
dc.date.available2007-04-10T19:36:25Z
dc.date.issued1994-07
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/50432
dc.description.abstractWe describe a generalization of the Vickrey auction. Our mechanism extends the auction to implement efficient allocations for problems with more than one good, multiple units for the goods, and externalities. The primary restriction on preferences is that they must be quasilinear.en
dc.format.extent61941 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.titleGeneralized Vickrey Auctionsen
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelInformation and Library Science
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelSocial Sciences
dc.contributor.affiliationumInformation, School ofen
dc.contributor.affiliationumcampusAnn Arboren
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/50432/1/gva3.pdfen_US
dc.owningcollnameInformation, School of (SI)


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