Generalized Vickrey Auctions

Varian, Hal R.; MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.

Generalized Vickrey Auctions

dc.contributor.author	Varian, Hal R.
dc.contributor.author	MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.
dc.date.accessioned	2007-04-10T19:36:25Z
dc.date.available	2007-04-10T19:36:25Z
dc.date.issued	1994-07
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/50432
dc.description.abstract	We describe a generalization of the Vickrey auction. Our mechanism extends the auction to implement efficient allocations for problems with more than one good, multiple units for the goods, and externalities. The primary restriction on preferences is that they must be quasilinear.	en
dc.format.extent	61941 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	en_US	en
dc.title	Generalized Vickrey Auctions	en
dc.type	Article	en_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel	Information and Library Science
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel	Social Sciences
dc.contributor.affiliationum	Information, School of	en
dc.contributor.affiliationumcampus	Ann Arbor	en
dc.description.bitstreamurl	http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/50432/1/gva3.pdf	en_US
dc.owningcollname	Information, School of (SI)

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