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Inducements to Advocacy: The Economist as Independent Expert

dc.contributor.authorMacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.
dc.contributor.authorPfau, Richard A.
dc.date.accessioned2007-04-11T03:28:26Z
dc.date.available2007-04-11T03:28:26Z
dc.date.issued1999
dc.identifier.citationin The Expert Economist in Antitrust Litigation, Daniel Slottje, ed. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1999. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/50449>en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/50449
dc.description.abstractThe appropriate role of the economic expert in antitrust litigation is to seek the truth, whereas the role for the attorneys is to seek the best possible outcome possible for the client. Yet the attorneys hire the economic experts, and the experts often work closely in many aspects of researching and developing the client's case. Can an expert economist provide an independent, professionally respectable opinion in this setting fraught with advocacy? We discuss the inducements to advocacy faced by economists who testify in antitrust proceedings, and ways in which a practicing economic expert might counter these inducements. We discuss two cases in which we have been involved to illustrate some of the important issues.en
dc.format.extent77794 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.titleInducements to Advocacy: The Economist as Independent Experten
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelInformation and Library Science
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelSocial Sciences
dc.contributor.affiliationumInformation, School ofen
dc.contributor.affiliationumcampusAnn Arboren
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/50449/1/advocacy.pdfen_US
dc.owningcollnameInformation, School of (SI)


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