American Commercial Television; Competition, Collusion, Regulation

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dc.contributor.author Hull, Brooks B. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2007-06-27T18:05:53Z
dc.date.available 2007-06-27T18:05:53Z
dc.date.issued 1982 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/55210
dc.description Doctoral Dissertation en_US
dc.description.abstract This paper’s objective is to use economic theory to predict behavior of the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), a commercial broadcast television trade association. To make predictions about a trade association of television stations, it is necessary to understand behavior of television stations broadcasting in a market with no trade association. Advertisers wish to show commercials to television viewers. Thus, television stations sell the exposure of viewers to commercials. A station in a market with no television trade association maximizes profit from sale to advertisers of commercial exposures. A television station uses three inputs to produce commercial exposures. A station can change the number of commercials in a program, change the type of program broadcast, or change program quality. A television trade association wishes to increase profit to existing television stations. An association achieves this objective by lobbying to prevent entry by new commercial television stations and entry by alternatives to commercial broadcast television. A television trade association is unable to control price or output of commercial exposures. Because of the difficulty of measuring other inputs to commercial exposures, a trade association can only control the number of commercials of member stations. To encourage voluntary membership, a television trade association offers valuable products to member stations at prices below what non-members pay and makes association membership known to all stations. Behavior of the NAB is consistent with predictions. NAB lobbying is used to restrict entry. Provisions of the Television Code of the NAB restrict the number of commercials shown by member stations. Regression analysis shows increased profit to stations in markets where a high proportion of stations are code members. Because the television industry is so extensively regulated by the federal government, predicting behavior of stations and their trade association also requires understanding government regulation of television broadcasting. Government regulators, such as the Federal Communications Commission, maximize political support by responding to preferences of all politically powerful interest groups. The NAB cannot rely on consistent favorable regulation because the FCC also responds to preferences of a large number of other broadcast interest groups. en_US
dc.format.extent 1341 bytes
dc.format.extent 42610464 bytes
dc.format.mimetype text/plain
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.subject Television en_US
dc.subject Commercial en_US
dc.subject Trade Association en_US
dc.subject FCC en_US
dc.title American Commercial Television; Competition, Collusion, Regulation en_US
dc.type Other en_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel Social Sciences (General) en_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel Social Sciences en_US
dc.contributor.affiliationum Department of Social Sciences, University of Michigan-Dearborn en_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumcampus Dearborn en_US
dc.description.bitstreamurl http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/55210/2/Hull B - Dissertation - 1982.pdf en_US
dc.owningcollname Social Sciences: Economics, Department of (UM-Dearborn)
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