On the Importance of Commodity and Energy Price Shocks for the Macroeconomy.

Abstract

Although higher commodity prices are commonly thought to presage higher rates of inflation, the existing literature suggests that the predictive power of commodity prices for inflation has waned since the 1980s. In the first chapter, I show that this result can be overturned using state-of-the-art forecast combination methods. Moreover, commodity prices are shown to contain predictive information not contained in the leading principal components of a broad set of macroeconomic and financial variables. These improved inflation forecasts are of little value, however, for predicting actual Fed policy decisions.

The remaining two chapters study the effect of energy price shocks on U.S. consumer and business expenditures. In the second chapter, I show that there is no statistical support for the presence of asymmetries in the response of real consumption to energy price increases and decreases. This finding has important implications for empirical and theoretical models of the transmission of energy price shocks. I then quantify the direct effect on real consumption of (1) unanticipated changes in discretionary income, (2) shifts in precautionary savings, and (3) changes in the operating cost of energy-using durables. Finally, I trace the declining importance of energy price shocks relative to the 1970s to changes in the composition of U.S. automobile production and the declining overall importance of the U.S. automobile sector.

An alternative source of asymmetry is the response of nonresidential fixed investment to energy price shocks. In the third chapter, I show that the apparent asymmetry in the estimated responses of business fixed investment in equipment and structures is largely an artifact (1) of the aggregation of mining-related expenditures by the oil, natural gas, and coal mining industry and all other expenditures, and (2) of ignoring an exogenous shift in investment caused by the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Once symmetry is imposed and mining-related expenditures are excluded, the estimated response of business fixed investment in equipment and structures tends to be small and mostly statistically insignificant. Historical decompositions show that energy price shocks have played a minor role in driving fluctuations in nonresidential fixed investment other than investment in mining.