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Corruption and Bureaucratic Structure in a Developing Economy

dc.contributor.authorBennett, J. Ohnen_US
dc.contributor.authorEstrin, Saulen_US
dc.description.abstractWe address the impact of corruption in a developing economy in the context of an empirically relevant hold-up problem - when a foreign firm sinks an investment to provide infrastructure services. We focus on the structure of the economy’s bureaucracy, which can be centralized or decentralized, and characterize the ëcorruptibility’ of bureaucrats in each case. Results are explained in terms of the noninternalization, under decentralization, of the ëbribe externality’ and the ëprice externality.’ In welfare terms, decentralization is favoured, relatively speaking, if the tax system is less inefficient, funding is less tight, bureaucrats are less venal, or compensation for expropriation is ungenerous.en_US
dc.format.extent363611 bytes
dc.format.extent1802 bytes
dc.subjectCorruption, Bureaucratic Structure, Developing Economyen_US
dc.subject.otherD73, H11, H77en_US
dc.titleCorruption and Bureaucratic Structure in a Developing Economyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumWilliam Davidson Instituteen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurl .pdfen_US
dc.owningcollnameWilliam Davidson Institute (WDI) - Working Papers

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