Normative Authority and the Foundations of Ethics.
dc.contributor.author | Silverstein, Matthew E. | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-05-08T19:12:35Z | |
dc.date.available | NO_RESTRICTION | en_US |
dc.date.available | 2008-05-08T19:12:35Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | en_US |
dc.date.submitted | en_US | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/58480 | |
dc.description.abstract | My dissertation explores the foundations of ethics—the question of whether and where practical justification comes to an end. What reason do we have to be moral? Is the fact that something is pleasurable at least a defeasible reason to pursue it, and if so, why? I argue that the only way to answer such questions is to look at what is constitutive of action. Nonnormative facts about the nature of agency can ground the normative authority of reasons for action. Recently, an influential group of externalists about reasons for action have argued that normativity is sui generis and cannot be further explained. Recently, too, many of the most prominent internalists to offer an explanation of normative force have merely assimilated the problem to one about motivational force. I argue that neither position is satisfactory. We need answers to our practical questions, and externalism has none to offer beyond brute intuitions. A purely motivational internalism, on the other hand, seems to fall well short of a normative theory. Appeals to facts about motivation do not answer the question of what we have reason to do; they bypass it in favor of the question of what we are going to do. Fortunately, there is a middle way that combines the best of both views: constitutivism. An account of practical normativity based on action’s constitutive aim can explain both how we are governed or moved by reasons and how those reasons have genuine, objective authority. The constitutive aim of action sets the agenda for practical reasoning, and considerations that engage this aim are the ones that bring such reasoning to a close. They settle the practical question of what to do. But if, as I maintain, the normative question of what I ought to do (or what I have reason to do) seeks considerations that bear on the practical question of what to do, then answers to the latter are ipso facto answers to the former. In this way, nonnormative facts about what closes practical deliberation can ground fully normative facts about what we have reason to do. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 978408 bytes | |
dc.format.extent | 1373 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.format.mimetype | text/plain | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.subject | Normativity | en_US |
dc.subject | Reasons for Action | en_US |
dc.subject | Ethics | en_US |
dc.title | Normative Authority and the Foundations of Ethics. | en_US |
dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
dc.description.thesisdegreename | PhD | en_US |
dc.description.thesisdegreediscipline | Philosophy | en_US |
dc.description.thesisdegreegrantor | University of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies | en_US |
dc.contributor.committeemember | Railton, Peter A. | en_US |
dc.contributor.committeemember | Darwall, Stephen Leicester | en_US |
dc.contributor.committeemember | Gibbard, Allan F. | en_US |
dc.contributor.committeemember | Lavaque-Manty, Mika T. | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Philosophy | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Humanities | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/58480/1/msilverz_1.pdf | |
dc.owningcollname | Dissertations and Theses (Ph.D. and Master's) |
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