Self-Creating Reasons: The Normative Implications of Identity.
dc.contributor.author | Stonestreet, Erica Kathryn Lucast | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-08-25T20:52:35Z | |
dc.date.available | NO_RESTRICTION | en_US |
dc.date.available | 2008-08-25T20:52:35Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | en_US |
dc.date.submitted | en_US | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/60711 | |
dc.description.abstract | According to a common philosophical view of practical reasons, normative reasons for acting are independent of agents’ desires. Desires are never reason-providing in themselves; instead, they are transparent to the reasons that support having them. With this view goes a picture of practical deliberation that is like science in its objectivity and detachment. But I suggest that there are times when a practical deliberator should not be so detached. Suppose an agent is forced to choose between two paths along which she could direct her life, and that the relevant desire-independent reasons are insufficient for her to choose one over the other. I argue that this kind of deliberative impasse transforms the question before the agent from “what to do” into “who she wants to be” because the situation engages the agent’s concept of herself as the author of her life. If she becomes inclined toward one of her options, with the sense that it represents who she wants to be, she may invoke her authority to choose her path as one who is in charge of actively leading her life. In choosing in this way, the inclination on which the agent acts has become a reason which is “self-creating” in two senses: (a) it is created by an existing self, out of elements that constitute that self; yet (b) it also helps to create and re-constitute the self, for it gives the agent reason to reshape those elements in a particular way, thus reorienting her life. I locate the normativity of self-creating reasons in self-respect. First, unlike mere desires, self-creating reasons are normative because they stem from the cares that give a person her unique identity; as I argue, this demands respect. Second, the agent may choose on the basis of the inclination, even though it outstrips any desire-independent reasons so to choose, because in doing so she acts as the author of her identity—a role which also demands respect. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 1110307 bytes | |
dc.format.extent | 1373 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.format.mimetype | text/plain | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.subject | Reasons | en_US |
dc.subject | Identity | en_US |
dc.title | Self-Creating Reasons: The Normative Implications of Identity. | en_US |
dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
dc.description.thesisdegreename | PhD | en_US |
dc.description.thesisdegreediscipline | Philosophy | en_US |
dc.description.thesisdegreegrantor | University of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies | en_US |
dc.contributor.committeemember | Darwall, Stephen Leicester | en_US |
dc.contributor.committeemember | Anderson, Elizabeth S. | en_US |
dc.contributor.committeemember | Paulson, Sarah Buss | en_US |
dc.contributor.committeemember | Shapiro, Scott J. | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Philosophy | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Humanities | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/60711/1/elucast_1.pdf | |
dc.owningcollname | Dissertations and Theses (Ph.D. and Master's) |
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