Labor Market Inequality and Atypical Employment.

Abstract

This dissertation presents four papers on inequality in the labor market. The first paper uses regression analysis to show which national contexts encourage high levels of atypical employment (part-time, self employment, and fixed term). The paper includes a review of current public policy designed to improve atypical employment including employment protection legislation, relevant judicial rulings, and union activity, and concludes with some policy directions. The second paper uses regression analysis and propensity score matching to examine the relative wages of fixed term workers in ten European countries. Findings suggest that fixed term workers have lower wages than their permanent counterparts in all countries, although they suffer a worse disadvantage in those countries with strict employment protection legislation. The third paper uses an agent based model of worker-job matching and shows that firms may use intermediaries (i.e. temp agencies) for reasons beyond just saving on compensation. As such, while income inequality may result from atypical employment, it need not be the driving factor behind it. In addition, the simulation finds that standard intermediary fee structures encourage the sorting of less skilled workers into indirect hire positions. The final paper uses network analysis to show that in academic sociology, organizational prestige can reinforce itself through professors' labor market transitions. In sum, the four papers use a variety of methodological approaches to illustrate several sources of inequality in the labor market for both individuals and organizations. The first two papers illustrate how these inequality-generating mechanisms might vary across countries.