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Economic Issues and Methodology in Arms Race Analysis
dc.contributor.authorLeidy, Michaelen_US
dc.contributor.authorStaiger, Robert W.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-04-13T18:38:43Z
dc.date.available2010-04-13T18:38:43Z
dc.date.issued1985en_US
dc.identifier.citationLeidy, Michael; Staiger, Robert (1985). "Economic Issues and Methodology in Arms Race Analysis." Journal of Conflict Resolution 29(3): 503-530. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/66574>en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-0027en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/66574
dc.description.abstractThis article reviews the recent contributions of economic analysis to the literature concerned with the process of national arms accumulation and the potential for arms control and disarmament. The role of formal model building as an aid to understanding the armament process is discussed. The existing economic literature in this area is organized and reviewed on the basis of the different modeling approaches that have been explored to date. Finally, strands of economic thought that have not yet been introduced into the arms race literature are explored, with the purpose of suggesting further applications of the economic approach to this important area of analysis.en_US
dc.format.extent3108 bytes
dc.format.extent3198501 bytes
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dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.publisherSage Publicationsen_US
dc.titleEconomic Issues and Methodology in Arms Race Analysisen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelPolitical Scienceen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelGovernment, Politics and Lawen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelSocial Sciencesen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumDepartment of Economics, University of Michiganen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/66574/2/10.1177_0022002785029003006.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/0022002785029003006en_US
dc.identifier.sourceJournal of Conflict Resolutionen_US
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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