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A Mark in Time Saves Nein
dc.contributor.authorDe Mesquita, Bruceen_US
dc.contributor.authorOrganski, A. F. K.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-04-13T18:58:46Z
dc.date.available2010-04-13T18:58:46Z
dc.date.issued1992en_US
dc.identifier.citationDe Mesquita, Bruce; Organski, A.F.K. (1992). "A Mark in Time Saves Nein." International Political Science Review 13(1): 81-100. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/66924>en_US
dc.identifier.issn0192-5121en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/66924
dc.description.abstractA method for predicting political interactions and policy outcomes based on two political theorems is presented and illustrated with an examination of the decision to merge the two German currencies. Political perceptions and actions are anticipated by combining the substantive knowledge of area experts with the theoretical insights embedded in the median voter theorem and a monotonicity theorem that links expectations to probabilistic statements of action. The proposed model has proven accurate about 90 percent of the time. The proposed forecasting method identifies a sequential strategy that may have been followed by Chancellor Kohl in forging the coalition needed to merge successfully the two German currencies. Using comparative statics, the analysis suggests how subtle and sophisticated Chancellor Kohl had to be to succeed in getting the policy outcome he desired despite stiff opposition.en_US
dc.format.extent3108 bytes
dc.format.extent1087767 bytes
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.publisherSage Publicationsen_US
dc.titleA Mark in Time Saves Neinen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelPolitical Scienceen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelGovernment, Politics and Lawen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelSocial Sciencesen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumDepartment of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48104, USA.en_US
dc.contributor.affiliationotherHoover Institution, Stanford, CA, 94305, USAen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/66924/2/10.1177_019251219201300106.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/019251219201300106en_US
dc.identifier.sourceInternational Political Science Reviewen_US
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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