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Using Ownership as an Incentive
dc.contributor.authorWelbourne, Theresa M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorCyr, Lindaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-04-13T19:21:10Z
dc.date.available2010-04-13T19:21:10Z
dc.date.issued1999en_US
dc.identifier.citationWelbourne, Theresa; Cyr, Linda (1999). "Using Ownership as an Incentive." Group & Organization Management 24(4): 438-460. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/67316>en_US
dc.identifier.issn1059-6011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/67316
dc.description.abstractAgency theory is used to develop hypotheses regarding the effects of ownership proliferation on firm performance. The authors examine the effects of chief executive officer (CEO) ownership, executive team ownership, and all employee ownership in addition to the moderating effect of risk on firm survival and stock price. Firms with low CEO ownership outperform those with high levels of CEO ownership across all levels of risk, but the effect is most pronounced for low-risk firms. Executive team ownership is negatively related to firm performance, whereas ownership for all employees is positively associated with firm performance, particularly for higher risk firms.en_US
dc.format.extent3108 bytes
dc.format.extent79493 bytes
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.publisherSage Publicationsen_US
dc.titleUsing Ownership as an Incentiveen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelManagementen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelSociologyen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomicsen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelBusinessen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelSocial Sciencesen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumUniversity of Michiganen_US
dc.contributor.affiliationotherHarvard Universityen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/67316/2/10.1177_1059601199244003.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/1059601199244003en_US
dc.identifier.sourceGroup & Organization Managementen_US
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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