The Extended Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons
dc.contributor.author | Huth, Paul | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-04-13T19:47:22Z | |
dc.date.available | 2010-04-13T19:47:22Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1990 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Huth, Paul (1990). "The Extended Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons." Journal of Conflict Resolution 34(2): 270-290. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/67765> | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-0027 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/67765 | |
dc.description.abstract | Three questions are addressed in this study: (1) Does a nuclear retaliatory capability contribute to extended deterrence against a nonnuclear power? (2) If so, is the deterrent value of nuclear weapons contingent upon the prior credible threat of conventional armed engagement by the defender? (3) Or, is the deterrent impact of nuclear weapons so potent that the conventional balance of forces has little deterrent impact? Competing hypotheses are formulated and then tested by probit analysis. The empirical findings indicate that (a) nuclear weapons do contribute to extended deterrence success, but (b) that effect is not contingent upon the prior threat of conventional armed conflict, and (c) there is an inverse relationship between the conventional balance of forces and the extended deterrent role of nuclear weapons. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 3108 bytes | |
dc.format.extent | 1858759 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | text/plain | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.publisher | Sage Publications | en_US |
dc.title | The Extended Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Political Science | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Government, Politics and Law | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Social Sciences | en_US |
dc.description.peerreviewed | Peer Reviewed | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationum | University of Michigan | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/67765/2/10.1177_0022002790034002005.pdf | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1177/0022002790034002005 | en_US |
dc.identifier.source | Journal of Conflict Resolution | en_US |
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dc.owningcollname | Interdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed |
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