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Multilateral Cooperation in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

dc.contributor.authorPahre, Roberten_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-04-13T19:56:06Z
dc.date.available2010-04-13T19:56:06Z
dc.date.issued1994en_US
dc.identifier.citationPahre, Robert (1994). "Multilateral Cooperation in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma." Journal of Conflict Resolution 2(38): 326-352. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/67915>en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-0027en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/67915
dc.description.abstractThere is a remarkable consensus among scholars of international relations that bilateral cooperation is easier to achieve than multilateral cooperation. This essay proposes a formal model to show that this is incorrect, because a multilateral agreement may achieve what an equivalent series of bilateral agreements cannot. The author explores formally several different enforcement mechanisms, suggesting that the argument is robust. Throughout the essay, the author uses examples from the Marshall Plan to illustrate the logic of this result. The argument has implications for other substantive topics, such as most-favored-nation clauses in trade agreements, the theory of hegemonic stability, analysis of the European Economic Community, the politics of linkage, and the study of multilateralist norms.en_US
dc.format.extent3108 bytes
dc.format.extent2771490 bytes
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dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.publisherSage Periodicals Pressen_US
dc.titleMultilateral Cooperation in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmaen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelPolitical Scienceen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelGovernment, Politics and Lawen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelSocial Sciencesen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumUniversity of Michiganen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/67915/2/10.1177_0022002794038002007.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/0022002794038002007en_US
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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