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Case Studies and Theories of the Arms Race
dc.contributor.authorEvangelista, Matthewen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-04-14T13:43:54Z
dc.date.available2010-04-14T13:43:54Z
dc.date.issued1986en_US
dc.identifier.citationEvangelista, Matthew (1986). "Case Studies and Theories of the Arms Race." Security Dialogue 17(2): 197-206. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/68522>en_US
dc.identifier.issn0967-0106en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/68522
dc.format.extent3108 bytes
dc.format.extent747161 bytes
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.publisherSage Publicationsen_US
dc.titleCase Studies and Theories of the Arms Raceen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelPolitical Scienceen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelGovernment, Politics and Lawen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumPolitical Science Department, University of Michigan, Ann Arboren_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/68522/2/10.1177_096701068601700212.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/096701068601700212en_US
dc.identifier.sourceSecurity Dialogueen_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceFor a discussion, in the context of the arms race, see James Kurth, 'A Widening Gyre: The Logic of American Weapons Procurement', Public Policy 19 (Summer 1971), pp. 373-404.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceThis method has been described and illustrated in a number of works by Alexander George, most recently in a chapter with Timothy J. Mc Keown, 'Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making', Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, Vol. 2, pp. 21-58. For earlier discussions, see A. L. George, 'Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison', in P. G. Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Fee Press, 1979), pp. 43-68; and A. L. George and R. Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceThe paper summarizes a longer study of decisions on production of nuclear weapons for NATO. See M. Evangelista, Explaining NATO's Nuclear Weapons, Occasional Paper of the Peace Studies Program, Cornell University, and the Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 1986.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceFor general discussions of NATO nuclear relations, see David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1983); and Paul Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO 1965-1980 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983). For an excellent study of the domestic politics of nuclear decisions in the Federal Republic of Germany, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Fahrplan zur Abrustung'? Zur INF-Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1970-1983 (Frankfurt/Main: HSFK-Forschungsbericht, 1985). For a consideration fo Soviet decisions, see M. Evangelista, 'Why the Soviets Buy the Weapons They Do'. World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 597-618.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceThe explanation presented here shares some features with the one discussed in a somewhat broader context by Eugene Lewis, Public Entrepreneurship: Toward a Theory of Bureaucratic Political Power (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980). For a comprehensive presentation of the Eigendynamik model, see Dieter Senghaas, Rüstung und Militarismus (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972) pp. 246-259.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGeorge B. Kistiakowsky, 'The Folly of the Neutron Bomb', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (September 1978), pp. 25-29.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceThese views are put forward, for example, in letters to President Harry Truman from Brien Mc Mahon, Chair of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the Congress, 21 November 1949, and from Lewis Strauss, member of the Atomic Energy Commission, 25 November 1949, in the Papers of Harry S. Truman, Naval Aide File, Box 13, Folder: Atomic Energy, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. The case is discussed in M. Evangelista, Technological Innovation and the Arms Race: A Comparative Study of Soviet and American Decisions on Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Ph. D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1986, Chapter 3.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSamuel T. Cohen, The Neutron Bomb: Political, Technological and Military Issues (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1978) p. 5; and Cohen, The Truth About the Neutron Bomb (New York: William Morrow, 1983), pp. 34-35.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceCohen, The Neutron Bomb, pp. 4-9; The Truth About the Neutron Bomb, pp. 36, 41.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceAs Cohen himself put it, Navy opponents of the ERW were 'spreading the world around' the Pentagon that the Polaris submarines 'were going to be doomed by neutron weapons'. The Truth About the Neutron Bomb, p. 51. For the role of Morse, ibid., pp. 14, 42-44, 47-55.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMorse's efforts are extensively documented in the archives of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. See the Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, OSB Series, Subject Subseries, Box 1, Folders: Atomic Energy Commission - General (7) and (9); Box 4, Folder: Nuclear Energy Matters (3) and (4).en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceThe report by Cohen was declassified with some deletions, at the request of this author. See Samuel T. Cohen, Low-Yield Fusion Weapons for Limited Wars (deleted). RAND Corporation Report R-347, 1 June 1959, located in the Office of the Staff Secretary: Records 1957-61, Subject Series, Do D Subseries, Box 3, Folder: Defense- Classified (1), Eisenhower Library. John Eisenhower indicated in writing on the report that the President was briefed on 10 November 1959. See also the letter from Cohen to John Eisenhower, 23 September 1959, ibid.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSee Edward Gemarekian, 'New A-Bomb "Pinpoints" Lethal Dose: Could Make Test Ban Meaningless ', Washington Post, 19 July 1959. See also Cohen, The Neutron Bomb, p. 12., and The Truth About the Neutron Bomb., p. 15.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKistiakowsky, 'The Folly of the Neutron Bomb', p. 25.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSee the discussion in Sherri L. Wasserman, The Neutron Bomb Controversy: A Study in Alliance Politics (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 24-27.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMilitary Applications of Nuclear Technology, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Military Applications, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 16 April 1973, Part I, p. 49.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceCohen, The Truth About the Neutron Bomb, p. 100.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceEnergy Research and Development Administration Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization, US Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 25 March 1977 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 4, 7, 30-31.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceFor example, Milton Leitenberg, 'The Neutron Bomb - Enhanced Radiation Warheads', Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 1982), pp. 341-369.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceThomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, Milton M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume I: US. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1984), p. 72. William M. Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1985), p. 60.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceThis account follows Christopher Paine, 'Senator Nunn's Shell Game', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (February 1985), pp. 5-8.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSee Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 181.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceOn the domestic sources of the two decisions, see Christopher Paine, 'Pershing II: The Army's Strategic Weapon', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (October 1980), pp. 25-31; and Robert J. Art and Stephen E. Ockenden, 'The Domestic Politics of Cruise Missile Development, 1970-1980', in Richard K. Betts, ed., Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 359-413.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSimon Lunn, 'Cruise Missile and the Prospects for Arms Control,' ADIU Report (September/October 1981), pp. 4-5. See also the account by Fred Kaplan, 'Warring over New Missiles for NATO', New York Times Magazine, 9 December 1979, pp. 46ff; and the discussion by Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), Ch. 25, esp. pp. 854-870.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceJane M. O. Sharp, 'Arms Control and Alliance Commitments', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 100, No. 4 (Winter 1985-86), pp. 649-667.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSee, for example, James A. Thomson, 'The LRTNF Decision: Evolution of US Theatre Nuclear Policy, 1975-9', International Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Autumn 1984), pp. 601-614; and J.M. Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 1983).en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceManfred Wörner, 'NATO Defenses and Tactical Nuclear Weapons', Strategic Review (Fall 1977), reprinted in Wolfram F. Hanrieder, ed., Arms Control and Security: Current Issues (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1979), p. 259. For a good discussion of the contradictions inherent in 'flexible response' and a skeptical evaluation of the rationales for the Pershing II and cruise missile deployments, see Leon V. Sigal, Nuclear Forces in Europe: Enduring Dilemmas and Present Prospects (Washington. DC: Brookings Institution, 1984), ch. 3.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSee, for example, Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1957); and the extensive bibliography in Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963).en_US
dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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