Fairness and Secrecy
dc.contributor.author | Chamberlin, John R. | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Scheppele, Kim | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-04-14T14:01:43Z | |
dc.date.available | 2010-04-14T14:01:43Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1991 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | CHAMBERLIN, JOHN; SCHEPPELE, KIM (1991). "Fairness and Secrecy." Rationality and Society 1(3): 6-34. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/68821> | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1043-4631 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/68821 | |
dc.description.abstract | This article examines the law pertaining to secrecy in contractual bargaining and argues that courts decide cases more consistently with contractarian principles than with economic ones. The economic theory of law claims that courts ought to require people to disclose secret information when that information was acquired as a by-product of other productive activity and to allow people to keep information secret when it was the product of significant investment. The contractarian theory argues that courts ought to (a) protect people from catastrophic losses, (b) require disclosure of secrets whose existence is not known to others, and (c) allow bargainers to keep visible secrets provided that their bargaining partners face roughly equal costs of acquiring the same information. A model is developed that specifies the effects of various information asymmetries in bargaining and shows how the courts focus on correcting the sorts of asymmetries that a contractarian would worry about rather than on correcting those asymmetries that an economic analyst would find most important. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 3108 bytes | |
dc.format.extent | 2694776 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | text/plain | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.publisher | SAGE Publications | en_US |
dc.title | Fairness and Secrecy | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Sociology | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Social Sciences | en_US |
dc.description.peerreviewed | Peer Reviewed | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationum | University of Michigan | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationum | University of Michigan | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/68821/2/10.1177_1043463191003001003.pdf | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1177/1043463191003001003 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citedreference | Bower, George Spencer. 1915. The law relating to actionable nondisclosure and other breaches of duty in relations of confidence and influence. London: Butterworths. | en_US |
dc.identifier.citedreference | Coase, Ronald. 1960. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics3:1-44. | en_US |
dc.identifier.citedreference | Frolich, Norman, Joe A. Oppenheimer, and Cheryl L. Eavey. 1987a. Choice of principles of distributive justice in experimental groups. American Journal of Political Science31:606. | en_US |
dc.identifier.citedreference | Frolich, Norman, Joe A. Oppenheimer, and Cheryl L. Eavey. 1987b. Laboratory results on Rawls's distributive justice. British Journal of Political Science17:1. | en_US |
dc.identifier.citedreference | Kronman, Anthony. 1978. Mistake, disclosure, information and the law of contracts. Journal of Legal Studies7:1. | en_US |
dc.identifier.citedreference | Posner, Richard A. 1986. The economic analysis of law. 3d ed.Boston: Little, Brown. | en_US |
dc.identifier.citedreference | Rawls, John. 1971. A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. | en_US |
dc.identifier.citedreference | Scheppele, Kim Lane. 1988. Legal secrets: Efficiency and equality in the common law. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. | en_US |
dc.identifier.citedreference | Verplanck, Gulian. 1825. An essay on the doctrine of contracts: Being an inquiry how contracts are affected in law and morals by concealment, error or inadequate price. New York: Caruill. | en_US |
dc.owningcollname | Interdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed |
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