View Item 

Show simple item record

To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation
dc.contributor.authorDurnev, Art A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKim, E. Hanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-01T19:25:30Z
dc.date.available2010-06-01T19:25:30Z
dc.date.issued2005-06en_US
dc.identifier.citationDURNEV, ART; KIM, E. HAN (2005). "To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation." The Journal of Finance 60(3): 1461-1493. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/72566>en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-1082en_US
dc.identifier.issn1540-6261en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/72566
dc.description.abstractData on corporate governance and disclosure practices reveal wide within-country variation that decreases with the strength of investors' legal protection. A simple model identifies three firm attributes related to that variation: investment opportunities, external financing, and ownership structure. Using firm-level governance and transparency data from 27 countries, we find that all three firm attributes are related to the quality of governance and disclosure practices, and firms with higher governance and transparency rankings are valued higher in stock markets. All relations are stronger in less investor-friendly countries, demonstrating that firms adapt to poor legal environments to establish efficient governance practices.en_US
dc.format.extent205148 bytes
dc.format.extent3109 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing, Inc.en_US
dc.rights2005 by The American Finance Associationen_US
dc.titleTo Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuationen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomicsen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelBusinessen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumUniversity of Michigan Business School, Ann Arboren_US
dc.contributor.affiliationotherUniversity of Miami Business Schoolen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/72566/1/j.1540-6261.2005.00767.x.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00767.xen_US
dc.identifier.sourceThe Journal of Financeen_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBebchuk, Lucian A., and Mark J. Roe, 1999, A theory of path dependence in corporate ownership and governance, Stanford Law Review 52, 127 – 170.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBerglÖf, Erik, and Ernst-Ludvig von Thadden, 2000, The changing corporate governance paradigm: Implications for transition and developing countries, in Boris Pleskovic and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds.: Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics ( World Bank, Washington, D.C. ).en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBerkowitz, Daniel, Katharina Pistor, and Jean-Francois Richard, 2003, Economic development, legality, and the transplant effect, European Economic Review 47, 165 – 195.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBhagat, Sanjai, and James A. Brickley, 1984, Cumulative voting: The value of minority shareholder voting rights, Journal of Law and Economics 27, 231 – 284.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBhagat, Sanjai, and Richard H. Jefferis, 1991, Voting power in the proxy process: The case of antitakeover charter amendments, Journal of Financial Economics 30, 193 – 226.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBlack, Bernard S., 2001, Does corporate governance matter? A crude test using Russian data, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 149, 1231 – 2150.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBlack, Bernard S., Hasung Jang, and Woochan Kim, 2002, Does corporate governance matter? Evidence from the Korean market, Working paper, Stanford University.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBreusch, Trevor S., and Adrian R. Pagan, 1980, The Lagrange multiplier test and its applications to model specification in econometrics, Review of Economic Studies 47, 239 – 253.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceCampbell, John Y., 1996, Understanding risk and return, Journal of Political Economy 104, 298 – 345.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceClaessens, Stijn, Simeon D. Djankov, Joseph H. Fan, and Larry H. P. Lang, 2002, Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings, Journal of Finance 57, 2741 – 2771.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceClaessens, Stijn, Simeon D. Djankov, and Larry H. P. Lang, 2000, The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 81 – 112.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceClaessens, Stijn, Simeon D. Djankov, and Tatiana Nenova, 1999, Corporate growth and risk around the world, Working paper, University of Amsterdam.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceCoase, Ronald H., 1960, The problem of social cost, Journal of Law and Economics 3, 1 – 44.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceCoffee, John C. Jr., 1999, The future as history: The prospects for global convergence in corporate governance and its implications, Northwestern University Law Review 93, 641 – 707.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceDemirgÜÇ-Kunt, Asli, and Vojislav Maksimovic, 1998, Law, finance, and firm growth, Journal of Finance 53, 2107 – 2137.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceDemsetz, Harold, and Ken Lehn, 1985, The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences, Journal of Political Economy 93, 1150 – 1177.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceDemsetz, Harold, and Belen Villalonga, 2001, Ownership structure and corporate performance, Journal of Corporate Financ e 7, 209 – 233.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceDenis, Diane K., and John J. McConnell, 2003, International corporate governance, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, 1 – 38.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceDoidge, Craig A., G. Andrew Karolyi, and RenÉ M. Stulz, 2003, Why are foreign firms listed in the U.S. worth more? Journal of Financial Economics 71, 205 – 238.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceFaccio, Mara, and Larry H. P. Lang, 2002, The ultimate ownership of western European corporations, Journal of Financial Economics 65, 365 – 395.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGill, Amar, 2001, Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: Saints and Sinners, Who's got religion? ( Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia, Hong Kong ).en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGlejser, Herbert, 1969, A new test for heteroscedasticity, Journal of the American Statistical Association 64, 316 – 323.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGompers, Paul A., Joy L. Ishi, and Andrew Metrick, 2003, Corporate governance and equity prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 107 – 155.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGreene, William, 1997, Econometric Analysis ( MacMillan, New York ).en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceHeckman, James J., 1979, Sample selection bias as a specification error, Econometrica 47, 153 – 161.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceHimmelberg, Charles P., R. Glenn Hubbard, and Darius Palia, 1999, Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance, Journal of Financial Economics 53, 353 – 383.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceJensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305 – 360.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceJohnson, Simon, Peter Boone, Alasdair Breach, and Eric Friedman, 2000, Corporate governance and the Asian financial crisis, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 141 – 186.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceJohnson, Simon, and Andrei Shleifer, 2000, Coase and corporate governance in development, Working paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKhanna, Tarun, Joseph Kogan, and Krishna Palepu, 2002, Globalization and corporate governance convergence? A cross-country analysis, Working paper, Harvard University.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKlapper, Leora F., and Inessa Love, 2003, Corporate governance, investor protection, and performance in emerging markets, Journal of Corporate Finance 195, 1 – 26.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKumar, Krishna B., Raghuram Rajan, and Luigi Zingales, 1999, What determines firm size? NBER Working paper no. 7208.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceLa Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 1997, Legal determinants of external finance, Journal of Finance 52, 1131 – 1149.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceLa Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 1998, Law and finance, Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113 – 1155.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceLa Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 2002, Investor protection and corporate valuation, Journal of Finance 57, 1147 – 1170.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceLins, Karl, 2003, Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, 159 – 184.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceLombardo, Davide, and Marco Pagano, 2002, Law and equity markets, a simple model, in Joseph A. McCahery, ed.: Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity ( Oxford University Press, London ).en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMcConnell, John J., and Henri Servaes, 1990, Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 595 – 612.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMorck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 1988, Management ownership and corporate performance: An empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293 – 315.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferencePistor, Katharina, Martin Raiser, and Stanislaw Gelfer, 2000, Law and finance in transition economies, The Economics of Transition 8, 325 – 368.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceRajan, Raghuram, and Luigi Zingales, 1998, Financial development and growth, American Economic Review 88, 559 – 586.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceRajan, Raghuram, and Luigi Zingales, 2003, The great reversals: The politics of financial development in the 20 th century, Journal of Financial Economics 69, 5 – 50.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSeawright, Stephen, 2001, Rankings a dangerous exercise, South China Morning Post, A2.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceShleifer, Andrei, and Daniel Wolfenzon, 2002, Investor protection and equity markets, Journal of Financial Economics 66, 3 – 27.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSiegel, Jordan, 2005, Can foreign firms bond themselves effectively by renting U.S. securities laws? Journal of Financial Economics 75, 319 – 359.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceWurgler, Jeffry, 2000, Financial markets and the allocation of capital, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 187 – 214.en_US
dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


Files in this item

Name:
j.1540-6261.2005.00767.x.pdf
Size:
200.3KB
Format:
PDF
View/Open

Show simple item record

Remediation of Harmful Language

The University of Michigan Library aims to describe its collections in a way that respects the people and communities who create, use, and are represented in them. We encourage you to Contact Us anonymously if you encounter harmful or problematic language in catalog records or finding aids. More information about our policies and practices is available at Remediation of Harmful Language.

Accessibility

If you are unable to use this file in its current format, please select the Contact Us link and we can modify it to make it more accessible to you.