View Item 

Show simple item record

Managerial Compensation and Capital Structure

dc.date.accessioned2010-06-01T19:52:19Z
dc.date.available2010-06-01T19:52:19Z
dc.date.issued2000-12en_US
dc.identifier.citation(2000). "Managerial Compensation and Capital Structure." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 9(4): 549-584. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/73003>en_US
dc.identifier.issn1058-6407en_US
dc.identifier.issn1530-9134en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/73003
dc.format.extent322098 bytes
dc.format.extent3109 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd.en_US
dc.rights© 2000 Massachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.titleManagerial Compensation and Capital Structureen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomicsen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelBusinessen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumThe Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel and University of Michigan, Business School Ann Arbor, Ml email: risrael@idc.ac.ilen_US
dc.contributor.affiliationotherThe Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel email: elib@idc.ac.ilen_US
dc.contributor.affiliationotherEerglas School of Economics Tel Aviv University Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel email: Spiegel@post.tau.ac.ilen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/73003/1/j.1430-9134.2000.00549.x.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00549.xen_US
dc.identifier.sourceJournal of Economics & Management Strategyen_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceAghion, P., M. Dewatripont, and P. Rey, 1994, “ Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information,” Econometrica, 62, 257 – 282.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceAgrawal, A. and C. Knoeber, 1998, “ Managerial Compensation and the Threat of Takeover,” Journal of Financial Economics, 47, 219 – 239.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBerger, P., E. Ofek, and D. Yermack, 1997, “ Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions,” Journal of Finance, 52, 1411 – 1438.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBerkovitch, E. and R. Israel, 1996, “ The Design of Internal Control and Capital Structure,” The Review of Financial Studies, 9, 208 – 240.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBlackwell, D.W, J. Brickley, and M. Weisbach, 1994, “ Accounting Information and Internal Performance Evaluation: Evidence from Texas Banks,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17, 331 – 358.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBronars, S. and D. Deere, 1991, “ The Threat of Unionization, The Use of Debt, and the Preservation of Shareholders Wealth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 16, 231 – 254.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceChung, T.Y., 1991, “ Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing,” Review of Economic Studies, 58, 1031 – 1042.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceDenis, D. and D. Denis, 1995, “ Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals,” Journal of Finance, 50, 1029 – 1057.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceDenis, D., D. Denis, and A. Sarin 1997, “ Ownership Structure and Top Executive Turnover,” Journal of Financial Economics, 45, 193 – 221.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceDessi, R., 1997, “ Implicit Contracts, Managerial Incentives, and Capital Structure,” Financial Markets Group Discussion Paper No. 296, London School of Economics.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceDewatripont, M. and J. Tirole, 1994, “ A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 1027 – 1054.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceFurtado, E. and V. Karan, 1990, “ Causes, Consequences and Shareholders Wealth Effects of Managerial Turnover: A Review of Management Turnover,” Financial Management, 19, 60 – 75.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceFurtado, E. and M. Rozeff, 1987, “ The Wealth effects of Company Initiated Management Changes,” Journal of Financial Economics, 18, 147 – 160.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGarvey, G. and P. Swan, 1992, “ Managerial Objectives, Capital Structure, and the Provision of Worker Incentives,” Journal of Labor Economics, 10, 357 – 379.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGaver, J. and K. Gaver, 1993, “ Additional Evidence on the Association between the Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 16, 125 – 160.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGrossman, S. and O. Hart, 1980, “ Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation,” Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 42 – 64.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGrossman, S. and O. Hart, 1982, “ Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives,” in J. McCall, ed., The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 107 – 137.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceHarris, M. and Raviv, 1979, “ Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information,” Journal of Economic Theory, 20, 231 – 259.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceHart, O., 1983, “ The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme,” Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 366 – 382.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceHart, O. and B. Holmstrom 1987, “ The Theory of Contracts,” in T. Bewley, ed., Advances in Economic Theory Fifth World Congress, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 71 – 155.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceHermalin, B. and M. Weisbach, 1988, “ The Determinants of Board Composition,” RAND Journal of Economics, 19, 589 – 606.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceHolmstrÖm, B., 1979, “ Moral Hazard and Observability,” Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 74 – 91.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceHolmstrÖm, B. and J. Tirole, 1993, “ Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring,” Journal of Political Economy, 101, 678 – 709.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceIsrael, R., 1991, “ Capital Structure and the Market for Corporate Control: The Defensive Role of Debt Financing,” Journal of Finance, 46, 1391 – 1410.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceJensen, M., 1986, “ Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers,” American Economics Review, 76, 323 – 329.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceJensen, M. and W Meckling, 1976, “ Theory of The Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305 – 360.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceJensen, M. and K. Murphy, 1990, “ Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives,” Journal of Political Economy, 98, 225 – 264.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceJohn, T. and K. John, 1993, “ Top-Management Compensation and Capital Structure,” Journal of Finance, 48, 949 – 974.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceJoskow, P., N. Rose, and C. Wolfram, 1996, “ Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry,” Rand Journal of Economics, 27, 165 – 182.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKang, J.-K. and A. Shivdasani, 1997, “ Firm Performance, Corporate Governance, and Top Executive Turnover in Japan,” Journal of Financial Economics, 38, 29 – 58.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKaplan, S. and B.A. Minton, 1994, “ Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards: Determinants and Implications for Managers,” Journal of Financial Economics, 36, 225 – 258.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKhanna, N. and A. Poulsen, 1995, “ Managers of Financially Distressed Firms: Villains or Scapegoats? ” Journal of Finance, 50, 919 – 940.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceLambert, R. and D. Larcker, 1985, “ Golden Parachutes, Decision-Making and Shareholders Wealth,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7, 179 – 203.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMatthews, S., 1995, “ Renegotiation of Sales Contracts,” Econometrica, 63, 567 – 589.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMirrlees, J., 1976, “ The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization,” Bell Journal of Economics, 7, 105 – 131.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMurphy, K. and J. Zimmerman, 1993, “ Financial Performance Surrounding CEO Turnover,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16, 273 – 315.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceNovaes, W and L. Zingales, 1998, “ Bureaucracy as a Mechansim to Generate Information,” http://gsblgz.uchicago.edu.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceRose, N. and A. Shepard, 1997, “ Firm Diversification and CEO Compensation: Managerial Ability or Executive Entrechment? ” Rand Journal of Economics, 28, 489 – 514.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSarig, O., 1998, “ The Effect of Leverage on Bargaining with a Corporation,” Financial Review, 33, 1 – 16.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceScharfstein, D., 1988a, “ Product Market Competition and Managerial Slack,” Rand Journal of Economics, 19, 147 – 155.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceScharfstein, D., 1988b, “ The Disciplinary Role of Takeovers,” Review of Economic Studies, 55, 185 – 199.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSmith, C. and R. Watts, 1992, “ The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies,” Journal of Financial Economics, 32, 263 – 292.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSpeigel, Y., 1996, “ The Role of Debt in Procurement Contracts,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 5, 379 – 407.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceWarner, J., R. L. Watts, and K. Wruck, 1988, “ Stock Prices and Top Management Changes,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 431 – 460.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceWeisbach, M., 1988, “ Outside Directors and CEO Turnovers,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 461 – 492.en_US
dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


Files in this item

Name:
j.1430-9134.2000.00549.x.pdf
Size:
314.5KB
Format:
PDF
View/Open

Show simple item record

Remediation of Harmful Language

The University of Michigan Library aims to describe library materials in a way that respects the people and communities who create, use, and are represented in our collections. Report harmful or offensive language in catalog records, finding aids, or elsewhere in our collections anonymously through our metadata feedback form. More information at Remediation of Harmful Language.

Accessibility

If you are unable to use this file in its current format, please select the Contact Us link and we can modify it to make it more accessible to you.