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Strategic Interaction and Trade Policymaking: Formal Analysis and Simulation
dc.contributor.authorClark, William Robertsen_US
dc.contributor.authorDuchesne, Ericken_US
dc.contributor.authorReed, William L.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-01T20:23:03Z
dc.date.available2010-06-01T20:23:03Z
dc.date.issued2006-04en_US
dc.identifier.citationClark, William Roberts; Duchesne, Erick; Reed, William L. (2006). "Strategic Interaction and Trade Policymaking: Formal Analysis and Simulation." World Economy 29(4): 507-520. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/73499>en_US
dc.identifier.issn0378-5920en_US
dc.identifier.issn1467-9701en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/73499
dc.format.extent166714 bytes
dc.format.extent3109 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltden_US
dc.rights© 2006 The Authors Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltden_US
dc.titleStrategic Interaction and Trade Policymaking: Formal Analysis and Simulationen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomicsen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelBusinessen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumUniversity of Michigan, Ann Arbor,en_US
dc.contributor.affiliationotherUniversitÉ Laval, QuÉbecen_US
dc.contributor.affiliationotherRice University, Houstonen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/73499/1/j.1467-9701.2006.00797.x.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00797.xen_US
dc.identifier.sourceWorld Economyen_US
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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