But Is It Myopia? Risk Aversion and the Efficiency of Stock-Based Managerial Incentives
dc.contributor.author | Carmel, Jonathan Paul. | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-06-01T22:29:14Z | |
dc.date.available | 2010-06-01T22:29:14Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2008-06 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Carmel , Jonathan (2008). " But Is It Myopia? Risk Aversion and the Efficiency of Stock-Based Managerial Incentives ." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 17(2): 541-579. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/75475> | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1058-6407 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1530-9134 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/75475 | |
dc.format.extent | 234243 bytes | |
dc.format.extent | 3109 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.format.mimetype | text/plain | |
dc.publisher | Blackwell Publishing Inc | en_US |
dc.rights | ©Journal Compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing | en_US |
dc.title | But Is It Myopia? Risk Aversion and the Efficiency of Stock-Based Managerial Incentives | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Economics | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Business | en_US |
dc.description.peerreviewed | Peer Reviewed | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationum | Ross School of Business University of Michigan 701 Tappan Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234 and The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzlia jpcarmel@umich.edu | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/75475/1/j.1530-9134.2008.00186.x.pdf | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2008.00186.x | en_US |
dc.identifier.source | Journal of Economics & Management Strategy | en_US |
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dc.owningcollname | Interdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed |
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