Strategic Solicitations: Explaining When Requests for Political Donations are Persuasive.

Abstract

Why do individuals donate to political causes? This is a central question of political participation. Each year, millions of people donate billions of dollars to interest groups, political parties, and campaigns. Much of the time, people donate because they are asked. This dissertation examines when donation requests are persuasive. A common argument is that they are more persuasive when they mention issues that people care about and are targeted at core supporters. I challenge these claims.

In the first part I argue that mentioning issues that people care about can actually emph{decrease} their willingness to donate. This situation arises when the issues that people care about also remind them of their personal financial struggles. Examples include unemployment, inflation, the cost of health care, and the cost of education. I show that this effect occurs even if people are willing to participate in non-monetary ways such as volunteering time. The second part of the dissertation builds upon the results of the first part to derive new hypotheses about who should be solicited for money. I show why, under certain conditions, political organizations have an incentive not to request money from core supporters but instead from people that initially do not believe that the organization shares their issue positions.

Overall, the results have broad implications for the success of organizational fundraising as well as the conditions under which common attempts to broaden the donor pool will be successful.