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Optimal Reserve Prices in Name-Your-Own-Price Auctions with Bidding and Channel Options

dc.contributor.authorCai, Gangshu (george)en_US
dc.contributor.authorChao, Xiulien_US
dc.contributor.authorLi, Jianbinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-13T19:54:22Z
dc.date.available2011-01-13T19:54:22Z
dc.date.issued2009-11en_US
dc.identifier.citationCai, Gangshu (george); Chao, Xiuli; Li, Jianbin; (2009). "Optimal Reserve Prices in Name-Your-Own-Price Auctions with Bidding and Channel Options." Production and Operations Management 18(6): 653-671. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/78715>en_US
dc.identifier.issn1059-1478en_US
dc.identifier.issn1937-5956en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/78715
dc.description.abstractFew papers have explored the optimal reserve prices in the name-your-own-price (NYOP) channel with bidding options in a multiple channel environment. In this paper, we investigate a double-bid business model in which the consumers can bid twice in the NYOP channel, and compare it with the single-bid case. We also study the impact of adding a retailer-own list-price channel on the optimal reserve prices. This paper focuses on achieving some basic understanding on the potential gain of adding a second bid option to a single-bid system and on the potential benefits of adding a list-price channel by the NYOP retailer. We show that a double-bid scenario can outperform a single-bid scenario in both single-channel and dual-channel situations. The optimal reserve price in the double-bid scenario is no less than that in the single-bid case. Furthermore, the addition of a retailer-own list-price channel could push up the reserve prices in both single-bid and double-bid scenarios.en_US
dc.format.extent372203 bytes
dc.format.extent3106 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Incen_US
dc.subject.otherReserve Priceen_US
dc.subject.otherName-your-Own-price (NYOP)en_US
dc.subject.otherSingle-biden_US
dc.subject.otherDouble-biden_US
dc.subject.otherDual-channelen_US
dc.titleOptimal Reserve Prices in Name-Your-Own-Price Auctions with Bidding and Channel Optionsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollowen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelIndustrial and Operations Engineeringen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelEngineeringen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumDepartment of Industrial and Operations Engineering, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109, USAen_US
dc.contributor.affiliationotherDepartment of Management, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas 66506, USA, gcai@ksu.eduen_US
dc.contributor.affiliationotherSchool of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084, China, xchao@umich.eduen_US
dc.contributor.affiliationotherSchool of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, Hubei Province, 430074, China, jimlee@amss.ac.cnen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/78715/1/j.1937-5956.2009.01045.x.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1937-5956.2009.01045.xen_US
dc.identifier.sourceProduction and Operations Managementen_US
dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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