Equilibrium analysis of capacity allocation with demand competition
dc.contributor.author | Liu, Zhixin | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-05-21T15:48:02Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-06-11T19:15:51Z | en_US |
dc.date.issued | 2012-04 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Liu, Zhixin (2012). "Equilibrium analysis of capacity allocation with demand competition." Naval Research Logistics (NRL) 59(3‐4): 254-265. <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/91147> | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0894-069X | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1520-6750 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/91147 | |
dc.description.abstract | This article examines the capacity allocation decisions in a supply chain in which a supplier sells a common product to two retailers at a fixed wholesale price. The retailers order the supplier's product subject to an allocation mechanism preannounced by the supplier, and compete for the customer demand. We perform an equilibrium analysis of the retailers' ordering decisions under uniform and individually responsive allocations. Uniform allocation guarantees equilibrium orders, but is not necessarily truth inducing in the presence of demand competition. Further, we find that (1) neither the supplier nor either one of the retailers sees its profits necessarily increasing with the supplier's capacity, and the supplier may sell more with a lower capacity level, and (2) capacity allocation may not only affect the supply chain members' profits but also change the supply chain structure by driving a retailer out of the market. This article provides managerial insights on the capacity and ordering decisions for the supplier, the retailers, and the supply chain. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012 | en_US |
dc.publisher | Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Capacity Allocation | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Noncooperative Game | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Equilibrium Analysis | en_US |
dc.title | Equilibrium analysis of capacity allocation with demand competition | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.rights.robots | IndexNoFollow | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Statistics (Mathematical) | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Science | en_US |
dc.description.peerreviewed | Peer Reviewed | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationum | Department of Management Studies, College of Business, University of Michigan‐Dearborn, Dearborn, Michigan 48126‐2638 | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationum | Department of Management Studies, College of Business, University of Michigan‐Dearborn, Dearborn, Michigan 48126‐2638 | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/91147/1/21486_ftp.pdf | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1002/nav.21486 | en_US |
dc.identifier.source | Naval Research Logistics (NRL) | en_US |
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dc.owningcollname | Interdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed |
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