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Prudential Value and the Appealing Life.

dc.contributor.authorCampbell, Stephen M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-02-04T18:04:45Z
dc.date.availableNO_RESTRICTIONen_US
dc.date.available2013-02-04T18:04:45Z
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.date.submitted2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/96015
dc.description.abstractWhat is it for something to be good for you? It is for that thing to contribute to the appeal of being in your position or, more informally, “in your shoes.” To be in one’s position or shoes in the broadest possible sense is to have that person’s life. Accordingly, something is good or bad for a person in the broadest possible sense if and only if it contributes to or detracts from the appeal of having her life. What, then, is a prudentially good life, or a life that goes well for the one living it? It is an appealing life. More precisely, it is a life such that having it is worthy of appeal, in and of itself. This dissertation is a defense and exploration of this way of understanding prudential value. I call it the "appealing life analysis." In Chapter I, I argue that this analysis fits well with our ways of talking about prudential value; preserves the relationship between prudential value and the attitudes of concern, love, pity, and envy; yields promising analyses of the concepts of well-being, luck, selfishness, self-sacrifice, and paternalism; and succeeds where three rival analyses fail. I also examine how this analysis bears on the relationship between prudence and morality and the debate between subjectivists and objectivists about prudential value. Chapter II draws upon the appealing life analysis to interpret a long-standing puzzle about prudential value and time. I highlight various ways in which this interpretation is informative and moves us closer to a solution to the puzzle. Chapter III provides a preliminary investigation and defense of an ethical theory that I call "prudentialism," which prescribes maximizing the appeal of having one’s own life. On certain conceptions of the appealing life, this theory has the virtue of avoiding the charge of being either too morally demanding or not morally demanding enough. I examine the structure of this theory, sketch a partial, substantive account of the appealing life, and discuss how the prudentialist can respond to various objections.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subjectWell-beingen_US
dc.subjectWelfareen_US
dc.subjectThe Good Lifeen_US
dc.subjectLucken_US
dc.subjectEthicsen_US
dc.subjectMoral Philosophyen_US
dc.titlePrudential Value and the Appealing Life.en_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.thesisdegreenamePhDen_US
dc.description.thesisdegreedisciplinePhilosophyen_US
dc.description.thesisdegreegrantorUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studiesen_US
dc.contributor.committeememberGibbard, Allan F.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberHershovitz, Scott A.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberAnderson, Elizabeth S.en_US
dc.contributor.committeememberRailton, Peter A.en_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelPhilosophyen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelHumanitiesen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/96015/1/cmpbell_1.pdf
dc.owningcollnameDissertations and Theses (Ph.D. and Master's)


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